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INTOLERABLE ABUSES: RENDITION FOR TORTURE AND THE
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗
ABSTRACT
In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, dismissed a complaint brought by five men claiming to have been
victims of the U.S. government’s extraordinary rendition program, alleged
to involve international kidnapping and torture at foreign facilities.
Procedurally required to accept plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the court
nonetheless dismissed the complaint before discovery had begun based on
the state secrets privilege and the Totten doctrine, finding that the very
subject matter of plaintiffs’ complaint was a state secret and that the
defendant corporation could not defend itself without evidence subject to
the privilege. This Article contends that courts should almost never dismiss
suits based on the state secrets privilege and should never do so in a case
like Jeppesen Dataplan, in which plaintiffs did not need discovery to make
out their prima facie case alleging torts by the government or its
contractors.
While much has been written on the state secrets privilege since 9/11,
this Article focuses on the role of the Totten doctrine in transforming the
state secrets privilege into something like a government immunity doctrine.
The Article first argues that Totten was wrongly decided because it is
overprotective of state secrecy and requires dismissal with prejudice of
suits that would more appropriately be dismissed without prejudice, subject
to refiling when the relevant secrets are declassified. The Article next
contends that Totten is a very narrow doctrine that cannot and should not
have any role in informing cases such as Jeppesen Dataplan in which
plaintiffs did not contract with the government.
In addition, the Article argues that the state secrets privilege, as laid
out in the 1953 Reynolds case and subsequently expanded by lower courts,
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the Valparaiso University School of Law and Drexel’s Earle Mack School of Law for providing the
opportunity to present working drafts of this Article at faculty colloquia. The Author gratefully
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David Cohen, Steven Feldman, Dan Filler, Richard Frankel, Alex Geisinger, David Herzig, Anil
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Tufariello for editorial assistance.
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permits pre-discovery dismissal of suits based on the state secrets privilege
and thus exacerbates the pro-government bias already present in Reynolds.
The Article explores nine ways in which lower court decisions have all
tended to make it easier for the government to assert the state secrets
privilege, while the lack of penalties for overly aggressive assertion of the
privilege results in intolerable abuses.
While the Article thus offers fundamental critiques of both the Totten
doctrine and the state secrets privilege, it does not advocate disclosure of
state secrets. Rather, in a concluding Part, the Article draws on federal
statutory schemes relating to the introduction of classified information in
trials and offers numerous alternatives to judgment in favor of the
government and its contractors before discovery has begun in cases
implicating state secrets. Congress has repeatedly empowered courts to
make decisions that protect government secrecy while facilitating limited
access to secret information when necessary in the interests of justice and
open government. In some cases, the government’s inability to defend itself
may necessitate the socialization of the costs associated with national
security secrets, but that result is preferable to forcing plaintiffs to bear a
disproportionate share of the costs of government secrecy.
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It is but a small step to assert a privilege against any disclosure of
records merely because they might prove embarrassing to
government officers. Indeed it requires no great flight of
imagination to realize that if the Government’s contentions in these
cases were affirmed the privilege against disclosure might
gradually be enlarged by executive determinations until, as is the
case in some nations today, it embraced the whole range of
governmental activities.1
Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force
disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a
complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to
intolerable abuses.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,3 five plaintiffs brought suit
against the defendant corporation (Jeppesen), alleging that Jeppesen had
contracted to provide transportation services and logistical support4 for the
U.S government’s extraordinary rendition program.5 In connection with
1.
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951) (upholding the district court’s
ruling ordering the government to produce an accident investigation report despite the government’s
assertion of the state secrets privilege).
2.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (upholding the state secrets privilege and
reversing the Third Circuit).
3.
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
4.
See First Amended Complaint at ¶ 14, Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 5:07-cv02798-JW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Complaint] (alleging that Jeppesen “furnished essential
flight and logistical support to aircraft used by the CIA to transfer terror suspects to secret detention and
interrogation facilities in countries such as Morocco and Egypt”).
5.
Id. at ¶ 2. The Complaint characterizes extraordinary rendition as involving the “clandestine
and forcible transportation of terrorism suspects to secret overseas detention facilities where they are
placed beyond the reach of the law and subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment.” Id. That definition is consistent with that current among scholars of the practice.
See Leila Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1201 n.4 (2007) (relying on definitions of “extraordinary rendition”
provided by the New York City Bar Association and Wikipedia). Recent scholarship exploring the
government’s extraordinary rendition program includes the following: Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to
Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2009) (providing a history of the
development of government-sponsored rendition, which was used initially to bring fugitives to trial, and
describing the significant expansion of the United States’ extraordinary rendition program under the
George W. Bush Administration until its abolition in January 2009); Lucien J. Dhooge, The State
Secrets Privilege and Corporate Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
469 (2009) (concluding that the SSP appropriately shields the policy of extraordinary rendition from
judicial examination); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1405 (2008) (arguing that from the Founding Era until 9/11, it was generally understood that rendition
required congressional authorization and was for the purpose of bringing a fugitive to trial); Victor
Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand,
33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629 (2008) (suggesting means of oversight of executive actions
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this program, plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen knew or should have known
that it was delivering plaintiffs to be tortured abroad and to be otherwise
subjected to interrogation techniques that would have been illegal if carried
out by the U.S. government itself.6 The government moved to intervene7
and to dismiss the case, alleging that it could not be litigated without
requiring the disclosure of state secrets vital to the national security
interests of the United States.8 By a vote of six to five, an en banc panel of
the Ninth Circuit granted the government’s motion and dismissed the claim
before the defendant had even filed its Answer.9
The district court had dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on Ninth
Circuit precedent on the state secrets privilege (SSP), which provides that a
court “should dismiss the plaintiff’s action based solely on the invocation
of state secrets privilege” if “the ‘very subject matter of the action’ is a
through the court’s role in providing individuals the opportunity to vindicate their rights while also
protecting legitimate state secrets); Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution, 28 REV.
LITIG. 479, 479 (2008) (relating that since 9/11, the United States has “reportedly transferred more than
100 suspected terrorists to countries that routinely torture prisoners” and focusing on the extraordinary
rendition of Maher Arar); Daniel L. Pines, Rendition Operations: Does U.S. Law Impose Any
Restrictions?, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523 (2011) [hereinafter Pines, Rendition Operations] (concluding
that U.S. law provides few legal restrictions and very few practical limitations on the ability of the
United States in rendition operations, whether to the United States or elsewhere); Sadat, supra
(examining the law governing rendition from U.S. territories or by U.S. agents and arguing that the
extraordinary rendition program from occupied Iraq violates basic principles and precedents of
international law); Margaret Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the
Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2007) (contending that rendition is among the
antiterror techniques that the U.S. government has defended through legal arguments that intentionally
“skirt[] the rule of law” by exploiting ambiguities and gaps in international human rights and
humanitarian law); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law: “Extraordinary Rendition” and
Presidential Fiat, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 102 (2006) (arguing that while U.S. presidents have only
recently claimed the power to authorize extraordinary renditions and U.S. history suggests that such
renditions are illegal, they are tolerated under principles of judicial deference to executive expertise);
David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and
Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295 (2007) (contending that the United States’ extraordinary rendition
program constitutes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and proposing legal mechanisms to
address those breaches); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture
Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006) (contending that extraordinary rendition violates both the
UN Convention Against Torture and domestic law prohibitions on torture and conspiracy to commit
torture); Matteo M. Winkler, When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal: International Law and European
Reaction to the United States Rendition Program, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33 (2008)
(focusing on the European reaction to the abduction of Abu Omar in Italy and concluding that the U.S.
extraordinary rendition program violates international legal norms prohibiting torture).
6.
Complaint, supra note 4 at ¶¶ 2, 16, 56.
7.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129–30 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(finding “good cause” to allow the United States to intervene).
8.
Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by the
United States of America, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. C-07-02798-JW (N.D. Cal. Oct.
19, 2007).
9.
Although the motion was styled as a motion to intervene, for dismissal or in the alternative for
summary judgment, the district court treated the motion as one for dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).
Jeppesen Dataplan, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. The Ninth Circuit panel that reversed this dismissal noted
that the court could not have granted summary judgment as discovery had not yet begun. Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 993, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009).
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state secret.”10 The “very subject matter” language used by courts in the
Ninth Circuit links the SSP to an 1875 Supreme Court decision, Totten v.
United States,11 in which the Court held that the estate of a man who
claimed to have been employed by the federal government as a spy during
the Civil War could not sue to enforce the spy’s agreement with the
government, because “[t]he secrecy which such contracts impose precludes
any action for their enforcement.”12 However, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
found that neither the Totten doctrine13 nor the SSP could be applied at this
early stage in the proceedings.14 The panel accordingly reversed the district
court’s ruling and remanded the case for application of the proper standard
of review of an assertion of the SSP, once the district court could determine
which documents or information the government was claiming were
privileged.15
The SSP, like Totten, is a court-made doctrine16 that permits the
government (and only the government)17 to refuse to respond to discovery
requests when there is a reasonable danger that such discovery would entail
the disclosure of state secrets vital to the national security interests of the
United States.18 Although the SSP is an evidentiary privilege,19 its use has
10.
See Jeppesen Dataplan, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–35 (citing Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d
1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1200 (9th Cir.
2007)).
11.
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
12.
Id. at 107; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) (citing Totten for
the proposition that an action must be dismissed on the pleadings where the “very subject matter of the
action” is a state secret).
13.
See Jeppesen Dataplan, 563 F.3d at 1001–04 (finding Totten inapplicable because the very
subject matter of the litigation was not a state secret and because the plaintiffs had no agreement with
the government).
14.
Id. at 1004–06 (finding no basis for dismissal of the suit based on the SSP).
15.
See id. at 1009 (“[N]either the Federal Rules nor Reynolds would permit us to dismiss this
case at the pleadings stage on the basis of an evidentiary privilege that must be invoked during
discovery or at trial.”).
16.
See EDUARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40603, THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND
OTHER LIMITS ON LITIGATION INVOLVING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (2009) (unpaginated summary
page), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R40603.pdf (calling the SSP “a judicially created
evidentiary privilege”). The Reynolds Court established the modern version of the SSP. Id. (“The
Supreme Court first described the modern analytical framework of the state secrets privilege in the 1953
case of United States v. Reynolds.”); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 167 (2006) (stating that the Supreme Court
first recognized the SSP in Reynolds).
17.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. But see Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 77, 91–138 (2010) (showing that the government often invokes the SSP at the behest of private
contractors and that asserting the SSP as an affirmative defense—even if they cannot invoke it on their
own behalf—is now standard practice for such contractors in response to all manner of claims).
18.
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9 (providing that, where it is established that “injurious disclosure
could result” were the government to provide a response to discovery requests, “the claim of the
privilege will be accepted without requiring further disclosure”).
19.
See e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing the
SSP as a “common law evidentiary rule that protects information from discovery when disclosure
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expanded since the advent of the “War on Terror,”20 and the government
has relied on the privilege to seek outright dismissal of cases before any
discovery has taken place whenever the government believes that the
litigation of the case would inevitably implicate state secrets.21 As we shall
see,22 the importation of the Totten analysis into the Ninth Circuit’s SSP
decisions has led to the conflation of two separate doctrines and the
expansion of the SSP to permit prediscovery dismissal in circumstances in
would be inimical to the national security”); LIU, supra note 16, at 1 (describing the SSP as an
evidentiary privilege derived from common law); see also Monarch Assur. P.L.C. v. United States, 244
F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (referring to the “common-law state secrets privilege”); Kasza v.
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the privilege as “a common law evidentiary
privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets”); In re United States, 872
F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing the privilege as “a common law evidentiary rule”); Nat’l
Lawyer’s Guild v. Att’y Gen’l, 96 F.R.D. 390, 394–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 2019 at 158 (1970)).
20.
There is some dispute about the extent to which this practice is an innovation. See Robert M.
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249,
1252 (2007) (contending that “recent assertions of the privilege are not different in kind from the
practice of other administrations” in terms of types of information protected, processes judges apply, or
remedies sought). But see Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939 (2007) (“The Bush Administration has raised the privilege in twentyeight percent more cases per year than in the previous decade, and has sought dismissal in ninety-two
percent more cases per year than in the previous decade.”); D. A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged
Executive: Why the Courts Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMPLE L. REV. 499,
522 (2008) (contending that the SSP has only recently been deployed to seek dismissal before discovery
has begun, thus merging the SSP and Totten). In a recent article, Laura K. Donohue has undertaken a
massive study of both reported and unreported cases in which the SSP has arisen, even if the court did
not end up addressing the issue in a written opinion. While Donohue criticizes previous scholarship for
reaching conclusions about the frequency with which the SSP is asserted based on published cases
alone, she concludes that the Bush Administration asserted the SSP in more than 100 cases, more than
five times the number that other scholars had noted based on published opinions. Donohue, supra note
17, at 87. She summarizes the effect of the SSP as follows:
It has been used to undermine contractual obligations and to pervert tort law, creating a form
of private indemnity for government contractors in a broad range of areas. Patent law,
contracts, trade secrets, employment law, environmental law, and other substantive legal
areas have similarly been affected, even as the executive branch has gained significant and
unanticipated advantages over opponents in the course of litigation.
Id. at 91.
21.
See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(stating that application of the privilege may require dismissal, either because the plaintiff cannot make
out a prima facie case or because the SSP deprives a party of information necessary to a valid defense);
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing the SSP as
both an evidentiary privilege and as a rule of non-justiciability); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d
296 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s prediscovery dismissal of a suit brought by a German
national alleging extraordinary rendition and torture by the U.S. and foreign governments); Tenenbaum
v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming prediscovery dismissal on state secrets
grounds in a religious discrimination case); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–
82 (D.D.C. 2004) (ordering prediscovery dismissal of all of plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory
claims upon finding that the litigation posed a “reasonable danger to secrets of state” (quoting In re
United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475 (1998))); Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (noting that dismissal is permissible
where the SSP prevents a party from defending itself); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d
268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (affirming prediscovery dismissal because disclosure of state secrets
at trial would have been inevitable).
22.
See infra Parts III–IV.
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which such dismissal is not required in order to protect national security
secrets.
In its brief in support of its motion to dismiss before the Ninth Circuit’s
en banc panel, the government argued for dismissal based on the SSP and
treated the Totten doctrine as a version of the SSP.23 Although the en banc
majority contended that the motion was not really one to dismiss, because
documents other than the pleadings were considered,24 the court considered
the government’s motion as dispositive of plaintiffs’ claims25 and thus had
to treat plaintiffs’ allegations as true for the purposes of the court’s
consideration of the motion.26 In addition, plaintiffs attached to their
complaint 1,800 pages of evidence27 supporting their allegations in order to
demonstrate their ability to establish their prima facie case without reliance
on discovery of materials potentially covered by the SSP.28
The six judges in the en banc majority thus had to treat as true the
following set of facts:
•

•
•

•

The U.S. government operated an extraordinary rendition
program involving the clandestine and forcible
transportation of terrorism suspects to secret overseas
detention facilities;29
Over a four-year period, Jeppesen facilitated over seventy
flights as part of the secret rendition program;30
At the foreign detention facilities, detainees were subject to
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment not in accordance with federal and
internationally recognized standards;31
The rendition program facilitated transport to states where,
according to the U.S. Department of State, use of torture in
interrogations was “routine”;32

23.
Redacted, Unclassified Brief for the United States, Intervenor-Appellee, on Rehearing En
Banc at 25–33, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-15693 (Nov. 13, 2009).
24.
Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1093 n.16.
25.
Id. at 1087–88 (concluding that all seven of plaintiffs’ claims describe conduct by Jeppesen
“absolutely protected” by the SSP).
26.
See id. at 1073 (noting that at this procedural stage, the court is required to treat all of
plaintiffs’ allegations as true and to draw all reasonable inferences in their favor). The dissent treated
the motion as one to dismiss. Id. at 1093–95 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
27.
See id. at 1095 n.2 & 1101–31 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
28.
See id. at 1087 (acknowledging that “[g]iven plaintiffs’ extensive submission of public
documents,” the SSP did not prevent them making out their prima facie case).
29.
Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 2, 31–39.
30.
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 15, 236–51.
31.
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 32.
32.
Id. at ¶¶ 14, 40–47.
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Jeppesen knew33 or reasonably should have known that the
detainees whose rendition it facilitated would be subject to
torture and other abuses in contravention of international
standards;34
Plaintiffs were detained for years, interrogated without
counsel, and transported to foreign prisons where they
were tortured and abused;35 and
Some of the plaintiffs were subjected to criminal
proceedings that did not accord with international
standards for fair trials.36

The Ninth Circuit treated as true plaintiffs’ claims that the government and
its contractors were responsible for plaintiffs’ extraordinary rendition and
torture. And yet, the majority still ordered dismissal of the suit based on the
SSP.37 In other words, the Ninth Circuit’s position is that, even if it is true
that Jeppesen conspired with the U.S. government to kidnap and perform
acts of torture on plaintiffs, plaintiffs are without a remedy because it
would undermine national security if the details of government
involvement in international kidnapping and torture, which have already
been established in 1,800 pages of publicly-available documents submitted
by plaintiffs, were to be revealed in the course of the litigation. That result
is the product of precisely the sort of intolerable abuses of the privilege
about which the Supreme Court expressed concern in Reynolds.38 A
political system premised on limited government and accountability cannot

33.
This claim was supported in part by the declaration of Sean Belcher, a former Jeppesen
employee, who stated that the director of Jeppesen International Trip Planning Services, Bob Overby,
had told him, “We do all the extraordinary rendition flights,” which he also referred to as “the torture
flights.” According to Belcher, Overby explained that, although some employees were unhappy about
the flights, the company would keep doing them because they paid very well. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614
F.3d at 1095 n.5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
34.
Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 2, 16, 252.
35.
See id. at ¶¶ 3–4, 59–89 (describing treatment of Plaintiff Mohamed); id. at ¶¶ 5–6, 94–118
(describing treatment of Plaintiff Britel); id. at ¶¶ 7–8, 126–49 (describing treatment of Plaintiff Agiza);
id. at ¶¶ 9–10, 153–88 (describing treatment of Plaintiff Bashmilah); id. at ¶¶ 11–12, 203–27
(describing treatment of Plaintiff al-Rawi).
36.
See id. at ¶¶ 6, 115–16 (recounting Plaintiff Britel’s subjection to criminal prosecution in
Morocco); id. at ¶¶ 8, 148 (describing Plaintiff Agiza’s subjection to criminal prosecution in Egypt).
37.
The Court was split 5–5, and Judge Bea cast the decisive vote in a concurring opinion, which
stated that he would have permitted dismissal based on Totten as well as the SSP. Jeppesen Dataplan,
614 F.3d at 1093 (Bea, J., concurring). For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the main opinion as the
majority opinion. Judge Bea’s concurring opinion adopts the reasoning of the majority as to the SSP.
See id. (concurring in the result and with respect to the majority’s analysis of Reynolds). Judge Bea
wrote separately only to state that he believed plaintiffs’ claims to be barred in their entirety under
Totten. Id.
38.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953)
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allow the government and its contractors to refuse to answer for conduct
that violates fundamental human rights and constitutional values.39
In the context of litigation relating to national security, courts have
been all too willing to set aside their constitutional duty to provide a check
on executive action.40 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc panel thus could find
ample, but by no means univocal, precedent supporting its decision to
dismiss the claims in Jeppesen Dataplan.41 Still, the decision is the product
of a series of wrong turns, each of which ratchets upwards unilateral
executive powers and diminishes the power of the Judiciary as a check on
the exercise of that power. This Article does not seek a piecemeal response
to the various upticks of executive power. Rather, this Article contends that
the very mechanisms for the assertion of the SSP are faulty and require
fundamental reconsideration and redress.
In Part II, this Article contends that Totten is a contracts doctrine and
has no application where the government engages in tortious activity, even
if that tortious activity arises in a contractual context. The Totten doctrine,
which has become a component of SSP analysis, was in any case
overprotective of national security interests from its very inception.
Moreover, Totten was never intended to apply and should not apply to
cases in which non-governmental parties never agreed ex ante that their
interactions with the government would be secret. However, because courts
have now interpreted Totten to stand for the general proposition that courts
should dismiss suits whenever the government claims that the “very subject
matter” of the suit is a state secret, Totten has infected SSP jurisprudence
and helped transform an evidentiary privilege into an immunity doctrine
that shields both the government and civilian contractors complicit in the
government’s allegedly tortious and even unconstitutional activities.
The approach of Part III of the Article is similar to that of Part II.
Because the modern SSP started with Reynolds,42 Part III begins with an
39.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) (“‘The very
essence of civil liberty . . . consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury,’ and ‘[o]ne of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803))); see also Fuchs, supra note 16, at 132,
139–47 (arguing that open government is a principle upon which our government was founded).
40.
See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for
Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) (“Historically, most scholars have accepted
with little question the notion that the Court will defer to executive views in core matters of foreign
relations, particularly where matters of national security are concerned.”); David C. Vladeck, Litigating
National Security Cases in the Aftermath of 9/11, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 165, 166 (2006) (noting
that “[w]ith few exceptions, the courts have shown considerable deference to executive branch actions
taken in the name of fighting terrorism” and that “judicial deference to national security claims is
neither new nor surprising”).
41.
See supra note 21.
42.
Laura Donohue calls this claim into question, arguing that it is based on little more than
scholarly disregard for Reynolds’ pre-history. See Donohue, supra note 17, at 82–83 (contending that
this gap in the scholarship “stunts our broader analysis, such as our ability to weigh Article II versus
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evaluation of Reynolds, which is faulty both in its model for testing
government assertions of the SSP and in its application of that model. The
flaws of Reynolds are now so well known and undisputed that reliance on it
as authority is about as scandalous as reliance on Dred Scott,43 Plessy,44 or
Korematsu.45 The case is flawed beyond reformation. It ought to be
abandoned and a new mechanism for testing government assertions of the
SSP needs to be worked out. Far from doing so, lower courts have
expanded on Reynolds. Part III concludes with a discussion of nine ways in
which lower courts have gone beyond Reynolds and thus expanded the SSP
in ways that Reynolds does not require. The result has been a conflation of
the SSP and the Totten doctrine that permits the government to seek and
courts to order pre-discovery dismissal of even cases like Jeppesen
Dataplan, in which plaintiffs do not require discovery in order to establish
their prima facie claims.
Part IV lays out an alternative model for protecting state secrets while
also permitting courts to adjudicate claims against the government and
contracting parties associated with the government. The mechanism is
simple. First, courts need to recognize that the SSP cannot be applied to
torts claims the same way it applies to contracts claims. Moreover, courts
need to distinguish between the application of the SSP to common law
torts, such as the negligence claim at issue in Reynolds, and statutory or
constitutional violations that suggest intentional abuses of executive power.
Second, the model restores balance to the adjudicative process by treating
the SSP like any other evidentiary privilege. Properly applied, the SSP’s
only effect is to remove privileged evidence from the case. Third, the
model calls for in camera proceedings conducted by counsel with security
clearance to permit the adjudication of claims that would otherwise have to
be dismissed on state secrets grounds. The model here proposed for
reforming the SSP borrows liberally from the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA),46 a statute passed in 1980 to address problems
involving classified evidence that defendants have sought to introduce in
criminal proceedings.

common law assertions, our understanding of the courts’ historical treatment of separation of powers, or
the role of state secrets as a justiciability doctrine versus an evidentiary rule”). While future scholarship
may fill the gaps that Donohue has identified, Donohue does not question that courts’ analysis of the
SSP universally takes Reynolds as its point of departure.
43.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (denying constitutional protections to
an African-American slave suing for his freedom), superceded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
44.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding laws requiring racial segregation),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding legality of internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II).
46.
Pub. L. No. 96-456 (Oct. 15, 1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2006)).
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The arguments made here are radical in two ways. First, the Article
calls for the courts to revisit and limit the Totten doctrine, contending that
most cases involving secret agreements should be dismissed without
prejudice, as the secret information may be declassified in the future.
Second, the Article contends that in some cases, the successful assertion of
the SSP should result in judgment for the plaintiffs because the government
agencies (or their contractual partners) are unable to assert their affirmative
defenses without introducing evidence subject to the SSP. Faced with such
consequences, the government will be less likely to assert the SSP in
circumstances when the risk that litigation will result in the disclosure of
national security secrets is trifling.
It is important to stress that while this Article assumes a radical
position, calling for drastic revisions in the SSP not advocated for or sought
by the litigants in Jeppesen Dataplan and other recent SSP cases,47 nothing
here proposed would entail any public disclosure of state secrets unless the
government chose to do so. Rather, the argument is that under the current
SSP regime, innocent third parties always bear the costs of state secrets. In
most cases, they should not have to do so, either because their cases could
proceed without the disclosure of state secrets or because their cases can
proceed in camera. In some cases, this Article contends, the government
may have to concede liability and pay damages in order to prevent
disclosure of vital national security information unless it can assert
affirmative defenses unrelated to secret evidence. If the government does
have to pay damages, the result is a socialization of costs, which is a
reasonable price for the nation to pay for the protection of state secrets,
especially when the alternative is to heap additional costs upon those who
already can claim credibly that they have been the victims of government
abuse.48

47.
In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the
plaintiffs conceded that the SSP requires dismissal if it removed from the case information
indispensable to either party. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc at 12,
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2009) No. 08-15693; see also
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that plaintiff agreed with the
court’s description of how the SSP operated and argued only that dismissal was not necessary in his
case because facts relating to his claim were not state secrets).
48.
In dismissing a claim based on the SSP, the Fourth Circuit’s Judge Wilkinson made the
following observation: “We recognize that our decision places, on behalf of the entire country, a burden
on Sterling that he alone must bear.” Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 1998) (“While dismissal of an action based on the
state secrets privilege is harsh, ‘the results are harsh in either direction and the state secrets doctrine
finds the greater public good—ultimately the less harsh remedy—to be dismissal.’”).
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II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ABUSE OF TOTTEN
In the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Jeppesen Dataplan, Judge
Bea cast the deciding vote in favor of dismissal, relying on the Totten
doctrine.49 While the majority did not base its decision on the Totten
doctrine, preferring to dispose of the case based on Reynolds instead,50 it
left open the possibility that “some of plaintiffs’ claims might well fall
within the Totten bar.”51 The fact that a federal circuit court would give
such serious consideration to the application of a contracts doctrine in a
torts case is a testament to the federal government’s tenacity in attempting
to conflate two doctrines related only by analogy.
In Totten, the administrator for the estate of William A. Lloyd brought
a claim against the government seeking to recover for the breach of an
espionage contract.52 The administrator alleged that Lloyd had entered into
an agreement with President Abraham Lincoln pursuant to which Lloyd
had infiltrated enemy territory during the Civil War in order to provide the
U.S. government with vital information relating to the military forces and
fortifications of the Confederacy.53 For these services, Lloyd was to be paid
$200 per month plus expenses.54 The federal government allegedly paid
Lloyd only expenses.55
Justice Field, writing in 1875, found that the subject matter of the
contract was a secret and that both parties must have known at the time of
their agreement that their lips would be “for ever sealed respecting the
relation of either to the matter.”56 In order to protect the public interest in
having an effective arm of the government that could engage in secret
services, the Court ruled that there could be no claim for breach of a secret
contract because the existence of the contract was itself a secret that could
not be disclosed.57
This Part first contends that Totten was wrongly decided. Even if that
argument is persuasive, however, the Ninth Circuit could not unilaterally
overturn a longstanding Supreme Court precedent. The Part further
contends that the lower courts have erred in applying Totten beyond its
original scope. The Totten doctrine only applies to bar claims by parties to
secret agreements with the government if the purpose of the suit is to

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1093 (Bea, J., concurring).
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105 (1875).
Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 106
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107.
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enforce the terms of the secret agreement. The logic of Totten cannot and
should not extend to parties whose interaction with the government was
involuntary. Courts have not even applied Totten in cases involving
statutory or constitutional torts claims brought against the government by
government employees. The Ninth Circuit thus erred in a fundamental way
in treating Totten as a sub-category of the SSP. To the extent that its
discussion of the SSP was informed by its understanding of the Totten
doctrine, its application of the SSP was misguided. But even beyond that, it
is time for courts to consider clipping Totten’s wings.
A. Totten Was Wrongly Decided
1. What Totten Stands For
Although Justice Field’s opinion in Totten is very short, the basis for
the dismissal of Totten’s suit is not entirely clear. The first ground given
for dismissal, and the principle for which the case is generally understood
to stand, is that Mr. Lloyd’s agreement with the government entailed an
implied covenant of permanent secrecy.58 The consequences of the implied
term as set out in Justice Field’s opinion are alarmingly broad:
This condition of the engagement was implied from the nature of
the employment, and is implied in all secret employments of the
government in time of war, or upon matters affecting our foreign
relations, where a disclosure of the service might compromise or
embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger the
person or injure the character of the agent.59
The language is alarming because it suggests that Totten could apply in any
case that could “affect[] our foreign relations,” an elastic category, and
disclosure in the case need threaten only to “embarrass” our government.
As discussed infra,60 protecting the government against embarrassment is
no longer considered a legitimate goal of government secrecy, and Justice
Field likely had in mind a now antiquated connotation for “embarrass” that
was closer to “undermine.”61
58.
See id. at 106 (observing that both Lloyd’s employment by the government and his service to
it were to “equally concealed”). Several cases have treated Totten as standing for the proposition that
courts must enforce the implied promise. See, e.g., Guong v United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
59.
Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
60.
See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
61.
In the nineteenth century, the word “embarrass” likely still had the connotation it brought
with it from its French antecedent, meaning to “encumber, hamper, impede (movements, actions,
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Justice Field then quickly segues from the notion of an implied
contractual provision to a public policy argument, noting that permitting
suits to enforce such secret contracts would threaten “serious detriment” to
the public.62 Even if there were no implied provision, Justice Field
indicates, the contract would be unenforceable on public policy grounds.
The secrecy that such contracts require is itself an insuperable barrier to
their judicial enforcement, says Justice Field. But he then circles back to
more conventional contracts doctrine and adds that any suit for
enforcement of a secret contract is itself a breach of—one presumes—the
implied covenant of secrecy.63
The final paragraph of Totten further muddies the waters as Justice
Field states that the Judiciary cannot entertain any claim the trial of which
would necessarily require the disclosure of information that the law itself
regards as confidential.64 Justice Field then proceeds to draw analogies to
marital and professional privileges.65 This last paragraph presents the
possibility of establishing a link between the Totten doctrine and the SSP.
Courts have not read this last paragraph as effectively establishing such a
link, perhaps because Justice Field’s characterization of the effects of
marital and professional privileges is simply wrong. Those evidentiary
privileges certainly bar the disclosure of certain confidential information
but none of them has the effect of the Totten bar, which is to render claims
non-justiciable.
2. Totten and the Problem of Overclassification
The problem with Totten is that it allows the government to declare
secret contracts non-justiciable, and that category of contracts could be
exceedingly large because governments tend to overclassify.66
Overclassification by our federal government has been so well-

persons moving or acting).” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com.libdata.lib.ua.edu/
view/Entry/60793?redirectedFrom=embarrass#eid (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
62.
Totten, 92 U.S. at 106–07. This language, as well as the language that implies that the rule in
Totten has to do with enforcing an implied promise of secrecy, is quoted in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8
(2005).
63.
Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
64.
Id.
65.
See id. (citing marital and confessional privileges, as well as attorney–client and doctor–
patient privilege).
66.
See e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1007 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009)
(discussing several cases in which former government officials have described abuses of the
classification process); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Senator Howard
Baker as summarizing the views of both Houses of Congress in noting that “the Federal Government
exhibits a proclivity for overclassification of information, especially that which is embarrassing or
incriminating”).
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documented, that there is almost no argument on the other side.67 In fact,
the most revealing criticisms of government secrecy come from the
guardians of secrecy themselves. Thus Porter Goss, speaking as a
Congressman before being named to head the CIA, stated:
I believe that we do classify too much material, because it is the
path of least resistance, and I know that from experience. If I get a
piece of paper on my table and I am not sure what to do with it, I
put a confidential stamp on it and put it in the confidential box.
Then I will not have to worry about whether I released something
that was classified that I should not have. So, the incentive is to do
the wrong thing, and that is something we have to get at.68
Donald Rumsfeld, writing as the Secretary of Defense, echoed this
sentiment in an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal.69 Equally
telling was former U.S. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold’s disclosure that
it was clear to him that the publication of the Pentagon Papers posed no
threat to national security.70
As Porter Goss has acknowledged, all of the incentives point in the
direction of encouraging people with access to government information to
overclassify.71 Existing checks on the tendency to overclassify are
ineffective.72 Despite shocking and notorious abuses of the power of

67.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 133–34 (noting that government officials frequently admit that
far more material is declared “classified” than is really necessary for national security purposes); Adam
M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53
UCLA L. REV. 909, 940 (2006) (“There seems to be consensus that the executive habitually
overclassifies as an initial matter . . . .”). According to the National Archives’ Information Security
Oversight Office, which is empowered pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 2001 (2011) to collect yearly statistics
on classification and declassification of materials from any agency that “creat[es] or handl[es] classified
information,” the number of classified documents increased from 23.1 million in 2008 to nearly 55
million in 2009. Most of these classifications were so-called derivative classifications. INFORMATION
SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 8, 19 (2009), available at http://www.arch
ives.gov/isoo/reports/2009-annual-report.pdf.
68.
Fuchs, supra note 16, at 149 n.94 (quoting Porter Goss).
69.
See Donald Rumsfeld, War of the Worlds, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at A12 (“I have long
believed that too much material is classified across the federal government as a general rule . . . .”).
70.
Erwin Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified Information, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
71.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 151–55 (discussing four incentives for government officials to
classify documents: avoidance of penalties for disclosure of secrets; evasion of challenges to
controversial government policies; foreclosing government liability or investigation into government
misconduct; and avoidance of embarrassment); see also Samaha, supra note 67, at 918–19 (noting the
likelihood that a bureaucracy with unrestrained discretion will likely disclose information that reflects
well on its work and withhold embarrassing information).
72.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 148–50 (explaining that while the Information Security
Oversight Office monitors the classification system, it does not entail sanctions for those who
overclassify, and even statutes like FOIA that are intended to encourage disclosure impose no penalties
on government officials who resist disclosure unsuccessfully).
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classification,73 no member of the Executive Branch of government is
likely to be subject to discipline for being overprotective of state secrets.74
Congress has stepped in repeatedly to combat overclassification, most
notably through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),75 and its various
revisions,76 all of which were intended to tighten controls on unnecessary
classification.77 As the Supreme Court recognized, FOIA “seeks to permit
access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view
and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such
information from possibly unwilling official hands.”78 Courts have
nonetheless been reluctant to question executive claims that information

73.

See generally ERIC ALTERMAN, WHEN PRESIDENTS LIE: A HISTORY OF OFFICIAL DECEPTION
4 (2004) (detailing four “key presidential lies,” ranging from Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and the Yalta Accords to Ronald Reagan and the Iran-Contra scandal); see Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1007 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Griswold’s admission that the
principal concern of classifiers is the avoidance of government embarrassment, former Attorney
General Herbert Brownwell’s 1953 letter to President Eisenhower complaining that classification
allows people to cover up mistakes and wrongdoing in the name of national security, and Reynolds in
which “avoidance of embarrassment—not preservation of state secrets—appears to have motivated the
Executive’s invocation of the privilege”). Another example of abuse of executive secrecy is the
Korematsu case, in which it later emerged that the government suppressed key information indicating
that Japanese-Americans posed no threat to U.S. security. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp.
1406, 1416–20 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (summarizing the findings of The Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians, and describing government memoranda suppressed at the time of the
original Korematsu decision and granting a writ of coram nobis to correct errors of fact that affected the
outcome in the original case).
74.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 148–49 (noting that administrative checks on secrecy merely
create reporting obligations with no mechanism for deterring overclassification). In the summer of
2011, J. William Leonard, the former director of the Information Security Oversight Office, filed suit
against the National Security Agency seeking to punish officials who classify documents that contain
no secret information. Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/us/02secret.html?_r=1.
Williams claims that in thirty-four years of government service, he rarely saw overclassification
challenged and never saw it punished. Id.
75.
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
76.
For example, in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), the
Supreme Court refused to review the substantive propriety of the government’s claim that the material
sought by plaintiffs was classified. Rather, judicial inquiry was only into the procedural aspects of
classification. Id. at 81. In the aftermath of Mink and the Watergate scandal, Congress revised FOIA,
overriding President Ford’s veto, to expressly provide for in camera, de novo review of government
claims to entitlement of a national security exemption from FOIA’s disclosure requirements. Fuchs,
supra note 16, at 159–60.
77.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 144–45 (observing that each of Congress’s amendments of FOIA
has reaffirmed its purpose to encourage democratic participation and citizen oversight of government).
Additional congressional actions intended to check executive secrecy include the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463 (Oct. 6, 1972), codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1–16 (2006 & Supp.
IV 2010); the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409 (Sept. 13, 1976), codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552b (2006); the Presidential Records Act, Pub. L. No. 95-591 (Nov. 4, 1978), codified at 44
U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (2006); and the Federal Records Act, Pub. L. No. 90-620 (Oct. 22, 1968),
codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3107 (2006).
78.
Mink, 410 U.S. at 80.
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
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needs to be protected from disclosure,79 despite clear legislative intent that
courts serve as a check on excessive government secrecy.80 Academics
have denounced the failures of courts to weigh the value of executive
secrecy against other constitutional values.81 Congress too has repeatedly
sought to curtail overclassification, most recently through the Reducing
Over-Classification Act, which President Obama signed into law in
October 201082—to no avail.83
From the government’s perspective, there is no downside to relying on
Totten when a court will not permit even in camera inquiry into the nature
of the threats to national security that might follow from disclosure. But
there is a downside to the United States and its citizens if there is no
counterweight to the incentives for individuals and agencies within the
government to overclassify. As is so often the case, the views of the

79.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 163–68 (reviewing case law and concluding that courts “have
generally been reluctant to probe agency explanations for decisions to withhold information on national
security grounds”). Cases interpreting the national security exception to the government’s disclosure
obligations under FOIA have produced doctrine bordering on the Orwellian. The government is
permitted to make what is known as a Glomar response, refusing to confirm or deny the existence or
nonexistence of the requested records because the fact of their existence or nonexistence is classified.
See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Are we really to believe that the government is so
far-sighted that it has classified information relating to information that does not exist? What is the
procedure for classifying non-existent information?
80.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 159 (citing the legislative history behind FOIA, S. REP. 89-813,
at 8 (1965), as calling for de novo review of administrative claims that documents sought under FOIA
may be withheld under the national security exception lest review become a “meaningless judicial
sanctioning of agency discretion”); Samaha, supra note 67, at 939 (characterizing the 1974 FOIA
amendments as an act in which Congress enlisted “the judiciary’s help in checking executive control
over classified information”).
81.
See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of AntiTerrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1144–47 (2007) (citing
authorities ranging from James Madison to Justices Brandeis and Stewart in support of the proposition
that the Constitution provides unequivocal support for neither freedom of information nor for official
secrecy); Eric Lane et al., Too Big a Canon in the President’s Arsenal, Another Look at United States v.
Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 737, 739–40 (2010) (criticizing Nixon for its failure “to address the
dangerous uses to which secrecy is so often put, as well as the natural human tendencies that lead
government officials to seek the cover of secrecy” and for its disregard of the constitutional problems
created by the presumption in favor of government secrecy); Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 203 (2008) (calling for courts to undertake a “searching review” of
governmental secrecy before allowing the government to withhold information); Sudha Setty, No More
Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Does Not Let the Terrorists Win, 57
U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 622–29 (2009) (providing constitutional arguments in favor of congressional and
judicial checks on executive secrecy). But cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the
Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (1999) (contending that the
Judiciary should have no role in delineating the scope of executive privilege).
82.
Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 Stat. 2646 (2010).
83.
As of March, 2011, only 19 of 41 federal agencies had complied with President Obama’s
Executive Order and implemented required de-classification regulations in final form. INFORMATION
SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2 (2010), available at http://www.arch
ives.gov/isoo/reports/2010-annual-report.pdf.

TELMAN EIC MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

446

Alabama Law Review

2/24/2012 10:32 AM

[Vol. 63:3:429

Framers were divided on the need for government secrecy.84 Still, there is
significant evidence that the structure of the Constitution is designed to
ensure that the government will operate in an open and transparent
manner.85
Secrecy is not without its costs; that is, secrecy is expensive.86 In
addition, there are intangible costs in the “steady evisceration of the
transparency and accountability essential to a functioning democracy.”87
More generally, the price of secrecy includes “undermining the legitimacy
of government actions, reducing accountability, hindering critical
technological and scientific progress, interfering with the efficiency of the
marketplace, and breeding paranoia.”88 The SSP can permit federal agents
to cover up their own misconduct and thus indirectly encourages such
conduct.89 Even if it does not promote misconduct, it certainly hampers
coordination and cooperation among different intelligence agencies, as the
9/11 Commission report concluded.90 One purpose of the USA PATRIOT
Act91 was to permit greater sharing of intelligence.92 It has not been entirely
effective.93
84.
See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 259 (2010) (finding evidence
suggesting that the Framers opposed government secrecy, but also finding evidence suggesting that they
recognized the need for government secrecy in some contexts).
85.
Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Seperated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 518 (2007) (“[T]he relatively public and dialogic nature of the legislative, treaty-approval,
and nomination processes again reflects a Constitution built on a presumptive faith in openness and
dialogue between the political branches and between those branches and the people.”).
86.
As of 2009, the cost of the government classification system was in excess of $8.8 billion.
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2009 COST REPORT 2 (2010), available at http://www.ar
chives.gov/isoo/reports/2009-cost-report.pdf.
87.
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA
in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).
88.
Fuchs, supra note 16, at 136–37 (citations omitted).
89.
See Donohue, supra note 17, at 172 (discussing In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir.
2007), in which a DEA agent claimed the CIA illegally spied on him in order to thwart his mission in
Rangoon, Burma).
90.
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 271 (2004) (recounting the frustration of one FBI agent who was ordered to
delete an e-mail message suggesting that one of the eventual 9/11 hijackers, whom the agent was
investigating in connection with the bombing of the USS Cole, had entered the country); id. at 276
(noting that the FBI was unable to put together the pieces of the puzzle that would have revealed the
9/11 plot and that publicity might have derailed it).
91.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
92.
For example, Section 905 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended the National Security Act of
1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (2006 & Supp. III 2009), to require disclosure of foreign intelligencerelated information to the Director of Central Intelligence. Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act, codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2006 & Supp. III 2009), permits use by federal officers of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to apply for an order approving electronic surveillance in order to obtain
foreign intelligence information.
93.
See Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT
Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1807–35 (2010) (describing remaining barriers to information sharing
among government agencies).
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The Obama administration has recognized the problem94 and taken
measures designed to encourage declassification and to curb
overclassification.95 Still, the problem remains,96 in part because too many
courts simply refuse to play the role Congress has delegated to them as a
check on executive secrecy.97
All this is not to say that there are no legitimate reasons for
governments to keep secrets. Certainly, at least some of the Framers
recognized the need to protect secrets vital to national security.98 No doubt,
the vast majority of classified documents are classified for good reason.
Nor does this Article advocate compelling government disclosure of
national security secrets. Nonetheless, there is a difference between
acknowledging the need for secrecy and asserting that there should be no
check on executive authority to determine what is and what is not a secret.

94.
See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness?” Disclosing Information to Congress Under
Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT 313, 314 (2010) (noting that openness and transparency were themes of
Obama’s presidential campaign and have been the subject of numerous executive orders issued by the
Obama Administration).
95.
Declaring that “democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the
activities of their Government,” President Obama issued an executive order intended to streamline the
classification process. Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). Another executive
order with the same purpose followed in November 2010. Exec. Order No. 13556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68675
(Nov. 4, 2010). Specifically with respect to the SSP, Christina Wells argues that the Obama’s approach
is one of “explanatory accountability,” which while promising, will not be effective unless coupled with
actual political accountability. Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 625 (2010) [hereinafter Wells, State Secrets].
96.
Although its critics viewed the Bush Administration as the most secretive in U.S. history, see,
e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 87, at 1063; see also Pozen, supra note 84, at 259 (listing Bush
Administration policies that departed from the Clinton Administration’s policies and increased
government secrecy), there are few indications that the Obama Administration is qualitatively different
from its predecessors, see Clark, supra note 94, at 315–17 (cataloguing the ways in which the Obama
Administration’s policies have disappointed advocates of open government). Certainly, the tone of the
two administrations is different. See Bill Keller, Dealing with Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Jan. 30 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html?
pagewanted=all (contrasting the Bush Administration’s response to the New York Times reporting on
the government’s warrantless wiretapping program with the Obama Administration’s response to the
Times’s cooperation with Wikileaks). On October 22, 2010, Wikileaks released 400,000 classified
documents relating to the war in Iraq. The Iraq Warlogs, WIKILEAKS, http://warlogs.owni.fr/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2012). While the CIA has denounced the release and vowed to investigate, it has only
claimed that “[i]n some cases,” the CIA’s mission has been compromised and lives have been
endangered. Sara A. Carter, Panetta Says CIA Will Probe Wikileaks Document Release, WASH. EXAM.,
Nov. 8, 2010, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/blogs/beltway-confidential/2010/11/panettasays-cia-will-probe-wikileaks-document-release. Indeed, the New York Times dismissed many of the
U.S. government’s objections to its publication of State Department cables released to Wikileaks on the
grounds that the publication posed no serious threat to American interests. Keller, supra (categorizing
government objections to information disclosed through Wikileaks and concluding that some of the
documents disclosed would cause the government “some embarrassment but no real harm”).
97.
See Samaha, supra note 67, at 940 (noting that courts have adopted the approach advocated
by President Ford in his statement accompanying his unsuccessful veto of the 1974 FOIA amendments).
98.
See Pozen, supra note 84, at 298 (citing Alexander Hamilton and John Jay’s “tributes to the
‘secrecy and despatch’ that only the executive branch can provide”).
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Congress has repeatedly instructed courts to act as such a check.99 The
Executive Branch does not have exclusive authority to determine when
national security secrets can be disclosed to courts, security-cleared
attorneys, or litigants solely for the purposes of permitting litigation to
proceed. When courts too readily defer to executive determinations about
secrecy in the context of the SSP, they are not being modest or humble;
they are being lazy. The courts have constitutional authority and a
legislative mandate to inquire into executive claims of privilege, and so
they must do it.
3. Totten Is Overbroad
Totten is an early example of the Executive Branch’s tendency to be
overprotective of government secrets and of the Judiciary’s willingness to
defer to the Executive Branch’s discretion in this area without much
inquiry or even a hint of skepticism. The Totten Court simply stated that
when Mr. Lloyd agreed to engage in espionage on behalf of the U.S.
government, he “must have understood” that his lips would “be for ever
sealed” with respect to that agreement.100 There is no basis for the Court’s
conclusion that Mr. Lloyd knew that his lips would be for ever sealed.
More likely, neither Lloyd nor the government was thinking beyond the
conflict at hand. During the Civil War, both the government and Lloyd had
clear incentives to treat their agreement as confidential. But by the time the
case was decided, that conflict had been over for a decade.
It is actually quite difficult to imagine a world in which there would be
any national security consequences if Lloyd’s activities were disclosed long
after the Confederacy had ceased to exist.101 As an initial matter, Lloyd
likely did not agree to keep his role for ever secret, but even if he did, the
government had no clear interest in maintaining that secret indefinitely.
Moreover, as clarified in a later case involving a man who claimed to have
undertaken sabotage for the United States during the Vietnam War,102 the
analysis under Totten seems to turn not on whether both parties believed
the agreement to be secret,103 but on whether the government unilaterally
determines the agreement to have been secret.104
99.
See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text.
100.
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875).
101.
See Guong v. United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[W]hatever military
secrets Totten might have uncovered during the war were certainly not current military secrets in
1875.”).
102.
Id.
103.
In Guong, the plaintiff argued that he never intended for his sabotage activities to be secret.
On the contrary, he conceived of himself as a soldier and assumed that his endeavors to blow up ships
in North Vietnamese harbors, id. at 1064, would result in public knowledge of his activities. See
Theodore Francis Riordan, Totten Doctrine: Judicial Sabotage of Government Contract for Sabotage
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Even if we concede that there may have been some grounds for secrecy
in the 1870s with respect to Lloyd’s espionage agreement, those grounds
are still not adequate to explain the Totten Court’s ruling that neither
parties to secret agreements with the government nor their heirs can ever
bring a claim to vindicate their contractual rights. At some point, the
justifications for secrecy must erode and disappear. The Second Circuit
recognized this principle when it refused to dismiss a complaint on Totten
grounds in Clift v. United States.105 The Clift court recognized that
dismissal of a suit was not necessary if the case involved a national security
secret that had become well known by the time of trial.106 As the Southern
District of New York put it in refusing to dismiss a case alleging
constitutional violations arising out of a government surveillance program:
In this case, the Government seeks to foreclose the plaintiff at
the pleading stage. Such a result would be unfair and not in
keeping with the basic constitutional tenets of this country. Here,
where the only disclosure in issue is the admission or denial of the
allegation that interception of communications occurred—an
allegation which has already received widespread publicity—the
abrogation of the plaintiff’s right of access to the courts would
undermine our country’s historic commitment to the rule of law.107
Here was a court exercising its constitutional function as a guardian of
constitutional rights against government encroachment.
Services, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 807, 813–14 n.29 (1990) (quoting Plaintiff’s Brief in
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 1–2, Guong v. United States,
No. 21-86C (Ct. Cl. Sept. 30, 1987)). In addition, plaintiff protested that the mission of which he was a
part had been publicized in books and memoirs published by former CIA and military officials. Guong,
860 F.2d at 1065.
104.
Guong, 860 F.2d at 1065 (finding that Totten applies equally to secret and covert agreements
and rejecting Guong’s argument that Totten applied only to matters that were still secret at the time of
the litigation); see also Kielczynski v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 128 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (“The decision of whether information that must be revealed is sensitive, including even an
admission or denial of the existence of a secret espionage contract, is reserved under Totten to the
United States.”); Daniel L. Pines, The Continuing Viability of the 1875 Supreme Court Case of Totten
v. United States, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1273, 1280 (2001) [hereinafter Pines, Continuing Viability] (noting
that the Guong court treated “secret” and “covert” agreements as synonymous for the purposes of its
Totten analysis).
105.
597 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1979).
106.
See id. at 830 (stating that the cryptographic system at issue in the case might in time
become as obsolete as a World War II era computer had become and thus that information relating to it
might be discoverable); see also Ticon Corp. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 134 N.Y.S.2d
716, 721–22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and ruling Totten
inapplicable on the ground that the data at issue in the case “may in due time be declassified”). But see
Guong, 860 F.2d at 1066 (rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments that the sabotage activities in which he had
been engaged had been disclosed in publications, deferring to the government’s “broader view of the
world scene”).
107.
Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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But the Totten doctrine does not encourage judges to exercise their
cognitive gifts. It creates a mechanical rule that courts apply to whatever
claims the government makes. Totten imposed no burden on the
government to demonstrate the continued need for secrecy, which means
that the government is encouraged to make its assertions of secrecy as
broad as possible. As discussed in the previous Subpart, the government
needs no such encouragement. The government relied on Totten in two
cases brought in the 1890s in seeking to dismiss claims brought on behalf
of two other Civil War-era spies who sought to recover their pay from the
government.108 It is hard to imagine what secrets about Civil War
espionage remained nearly three decades after the cessation of hostilities.
Permitting or requiring government intelligence agencies to share
information of general concern with the public is a different matter from
requiring the government to share such information with adverse litigants.
However, nothing in this Article is intended to suggest it must do the latter.
The procedures associated with the SSP already require in camera review
of classified affidavits supporting the assertion of the SSP.109 If the subject
matter is so sensitive that disclosure to the plaintiff is impossible, the
plaintiff may be permitted to secure counsel with security clearance and the
matter may proceed in camera with all documents under seal. In earlier SSP
cases, courts availed themselves of this option or found other ways to
permit cases to proceed without endangering state secrets.110
As an initial matter, the problem with the Totten doctrine is twofold.
First, it encourages courts to accord complete deference to governmental
claims of secrecy despite strong evidence that the government
overclassifies. Second, it requires dismissal of suits with prejudice, when
the more logical alternative, as suggested in cases such as Clift and
Spock,111 is to dismiss suits that implicate secret agreements without
prejudice, while tolling any relevant statutes of limitations so as to permit
the suit to proceed once the state secrets at issue have been declassified.
There has to be some check on governmental assertions of secrecy if the

108.
See De Arnaud v. United States, 151 U.S. 483, 493 (1894) (discussing Totten and suggesting
it would apply to “military experts” as well as to spies, although deciding for the government on other
grounds); Allen v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 89 (1892) (finding plaintiff’s claim barred by Totten and
other doctrines).
109.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953). In Jeppesen Dataplan, then-director
of the CIA, Michael Hayden, submitted a classified declaration in support of the government’s assertion
of the SSP. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2009).
110.
For example, in Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958), the Second Circuit
responded to the assertion of the SSP by remanding the entire case for an in camera trial. See also
Telman, supra note 20, at 519–22 (discussing courts’ creative attempts to both preserve state secrets
and permit litigants their opportunity to be heard).
111.
See discussion supra accompanying notes 105–107.
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Totten doctrine is not to become a mechanism whereby the government
makes unjustified claims of secrecy in order to avoid embarrassment.112
4. Totten Can Be Harmful to National Security Interests
Why do people contract with the government? Perhaps they do so out
of a sense of patriotism or duty. Mr. Lloyd put his life on the line, and so it
seems likely that commitment to the Union cause played a role in his
decision to engage in espionage on behalf of the government. But clearly
patriotism alone was not enough. He expected to be paid for his efforts on
the government’s behalf.113 That being the case, he might not have been
willing to serve if he knew that the government had the option of not
paying. It follows that the Totten doctrine could deter people from entering
into agreements with the government or at least raise the cost of such
agreements.
The economic disincentives to cooperation with the government
associated with the Totten doctrine are even clearer in Tenet v. Doe,114 a
case in which the Supreme Court revisited Totten for the first time in 130
years.115 The plaintiffs in Tenet, whom the court refers to as “John and Jane
Doe,” were foreign nationals. John Doe was a high-ranking diplomat in a
foreign country that at the time was considered an enemy of the United
States.116 The couple allegedly expressed interest in defecting to the United
States. They were permitted to do so, but only after remaining at their posts
for some time in order to conduct espionage on behalf of the United
States.117 They alleged that the government promised them financial and
personal security for life.118 With assistance from the government, John
Doe found work in the private sector. As his salary increased, he weaned
himself off of government support and ultimately agreed to a
discontinuation of government benefits while he was working.119 He was
eventually laid off due to a corporate merger, and government restrictions
on his employment made it impossible for him to find a new job. He
112.
See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951) (cautioning that the SSP
might become a mechanism whereby the government could prevent the disclosure of information that
would cause embarrassment).
113.
See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875) (indicating an agreement according to
which Lloyd was to be paid $200 a month).
114.
544 U.S. 1 (2005).
115.
It was necessary for the Court to reaffirm its commitment to Totten in Tenet because district
courts had been whittling away at the doctrine in the late twentieth century. See Pines, Continuing
Viability, supra note 104, at 1282–98 (describing cases in which courts variously limited the
applicability of the Totten doctrine).
116.
Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3.
117.
Id. at 3–4.
118.
Id. at 4.
119.
Id.
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therefore asked to be permitted to return to work in the Department of
State, but that request was denied.120
In order to escape Totten, the Does sued alleging not breach of contract
but promissory estoppel and due process violations.121 The Court rejected
their claims, relying on the Totten doctrine and clarifying that the doctrine
covered not only breach of contract claims but all claims involving
voluntary agreements with the government.122
The facts of Tenet make clear that plaintiffs were not likely motivated
by patriotism, since they were neither U.S. citizens nor residents at the time
of their agreement with the government.123 They might have had some
notional allegiance to what they took the United States to stand for—
perhaps such ideas as personal freedom, government accountability and the
free market. If such factors motivated them to defect and live in the United
States, they were surely disappointed. And other similarly situated wouldbe agents of the United States would clearly be deterred from risking their
lives, separating themselves from family and loved ones, and moving to a
foreign country if they learned of the outcome in Tenet. In short, whenever
parties contract for compensation from the government, they have an
expectation of being paid, and that expectation is part of their motivation
for entering into the agreement.
But Totten renders illusory124 some agreements with the government
that relate to national security, and given the tendency toward
overclassification discussed above, the category of secret agreements can
be extremely broad.125 Because the government, in certain circumstances
cannot be sued for breach of a secret agreement, it effectively gives no
consideration in return for the goods or services it receives through such
agreements.126 That being the case, Totten puts parties on notice that when
they provide goods or services to the government for purposes relating to
national security, they are making bargains that the government will honor,

120.
Id. at 4–5.
121.
Id. at 5–6.
122.
Id. at 8.
123.
Id. at 4.
124.
See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.13 at 75–76 (4th ed. 2004)
(describing illusory contracts as promises conditioned on events entirely within the control of the
promisor). Totten cases seem to fall within the category, because the determination that the alleged
agreement in question remains a state secret is entirely within the power of the government.
125.
Even back in 1982, the scope of state secrets could be quite broad. See Note, The Military
and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE
L.J. 570, 578 n.50 (1982) (highlighting cases involving “domestic intelligence activities widely
assumed to occur, or otherwise not surprising to the public”).
126.
See Tyler Brochstein, Comment, The Totten Doctrine: Is the Purpose Behind Totten MIA?,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 65, 85 (2007) (calling Totten devastating for national security because it makes it
difficult to recruit new espionage operatives).
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unless for some reason it decides not to do so. Rational actors should not
enter into such agreements.
The fact that the government usually abides by its contractual
obligations does not change the fact that, in some situations, the
government is under no obligation to do so. It only changes the amount of
consideration a party should demand in return for its performance. A party
contracting with the government may conclude that there is a 3% chance
that the government will breach its obligations in connection with a
particular agreement relating to national security information. The
contracting party with bargaining power should thus negotiate a 3%
increase in its pay to protect itself against the risk of loss.127 But people
such as Lloyd have little bargaining power and they are not interested in
percentages. Either they are willing to perform services for the government
for free or they should be unwilling to take the risk that the government
will breach.
It is reasonable to object that Totten has been around for 135 years, and
its logic has not prevented the government from finding contracting
partners. One possible explanation is that Totten has not deterred parties
from contracting with the government, but it has raised the government’s
costs associated with secret agreements for the reasons given above. If it
has not done so, the parties that contract with the government are either
lacking in information or are subject to various cognitive biases that are
leading them to expend labor and resources on behalf of a government that
is entitled by law to stiff them.128 In any case, the potential expansion of
Totten through cases like Jeppesen Dataplan is troubling, as it undermines
confidence in the government and could drive people who might otherwise
be inclined to cooperate with the government to refuse to offer their
services to the government.

127.
In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided General Dynamics Corp. v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). In that case, the Court considered “what remedy is proper when, to protect state
secrets, a court dismisses a Government contractor’s prima facie valid affirmative defense to the
Government’s allegations of contractual breach.” Id. at 1903. The Court concluded that it is proper if a
court provides no remedy whatsoever. In cases that cannot proceed without the revelation of state
secrets, a court must leave the parties as they are at the commencement of litigation. Id. at 1909. A
government contractor that wants to insure itself in case of government breach would do well to
demand progress payments.
128.
See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (“Various data suggest that people . . . tend to be
unrealistically optimistic about the future.”). On the optimism bias in the contractual context, see, e.g.,
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1400 (2004) (noting that optimism bias
leads consumers to underestimate the risk of contingencies that might result in economic hardship);
Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101
MICH. L. REV. 482, 505 (2002) (noting that individuals exhibit optimistic bias, leading them to
overestimate their positive traits and to underestimate their vulnerability to risks); id. at 508–12
(discussing the desirability bias and related phenomena that exacerbate the effect of the optimism bias).
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The point is not to force the disclosure of national security secrets, nor
is it to permit judges, rather than qualified experts within the Executive
Branch, to determine when a case implicates genuine national security
secrets. Deference to the Executive Branch is perfectly appropriate in this
area, but it must be deference to specific, detailed explanations and not to
general principles, such as that announced by the Totten Court, that the
government does not have to abide by its contractual obligations any time it
says that the contract at issue is secret. The inquiry does not have to be
particularly searching, but it must be searching enough to deter the
government from relying on Totten in order to protect itself from
embarrassment or to prevent the disclosure of conduct that does not
implicate national security secrets.
B. Totten Is a Contracts Doctrine and Can Have No Application to
Plaintiffs’ Claims in Jeppesen Dataplan
The conflation of the SSP and the Totten doctrine gives rise to
intolerable abuses of the SSP, as courts increasingly find that they must
dismiss suits based on the SSP, even where, as in Jeppesen Dataplan, the
government cannot show that plaintiffs are unable to make out their prima
facie case without documents or information subject to the SSP.129 In the
decisive concurring opinion in Jeppesen Dataplan, Judge Bea concluded
that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Totten because its very
subject matter is a state secret.130 But for the reasons given below, Totten
should not apply to Jeppesen Dataplan or to other, similar cases.
The SSP is an evidentiary privilege that merely excuses the
government, or the parties on whose behalf it intervenes, from their
discovery obligations to the extent that the discovery seeks the disclosure
of information subject to the privilege.131 As the D.C. Circuit noted, when
the government successfully invokes the SSP, “[t]he result is simply that
the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness had died, and the case will
proceed accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting from the
loss of the evidence.”132 However, because the government now frequently
invokes the SSP to seek pre-discovery dismissal of lawsuits, its effects now
129.
See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305–07 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing various cases in
which the unavailability of privileged information has resulted in dismissal).
130.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bea,
J., concurring).
131.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1953) (analogizing the SSP to the privilege
against self-incrimination); see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.
2009) (contrasting Reynolds to the Totten bar in that the former “prevents only discovery of secret
evidence when disclosure would threaten national security”).
132.
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 233 (1972)).
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mimic those of the Totten doctrine. Such dismissals cannot be reconciled
with the Reynolds Court’s understanding of the SSP as evidentiary in
nature.133 The Supreme Court itself recognized the difference between the
two doctrines in Tenet, in which it characterized Totten as a “unique and
categorical” bar that precludes judicial inquiry.134 The Court characterized
the SSP, by contrast, as an evidentiary privilege, requiring careful
balancing and representing a “formula of compromise.”135 Totten does not
create an evidentiary privilege; it is a contracts doctrine that renders suits to
enforce secret agreements non-justiciable.136
The Jeppesen Dataplan majority opinion gets off to a rocky start by
treating the Totten doctrine as a subspecies of the SSP.137 The conflation of
the SSP and Totten is an error, and the fact that other lower courts have
made the same error does not render it any less so.138 The reason for the
error is clear. Reynolds cited Totten as authority for the principle that a suit
must be dismissed when its very subject matter is a state secret.139 The
government has repeatedly capitalized on this footnote to urge a conflation
of the doctrines so as to require dismissal of suits on SSP grounds

133.
See Advisory Committee’s Note to Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509(e), 56
F.R.D. 183, 254 (1973) (“If privilege is successfully claimed by the government in litigation to which it
is not a party, the effect is simply to make the evidence unavailable, as though a witness had died or
claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, and no specification of the consequences is
necessary.”). The drafters of proposed Rule 509 thought they were simply codifying Reynolds. See
Advisory Committee’s Note to Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509, 46 F.R.D. 161, 274–
76 (1969) (noting that the rule aims at protection of military and state secrets as established by the law
of evidence as noted in Reynolds).
134.
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4.
135.
Id. at 9–10; Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.
136.
See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 65 n.60 (characterizing Totten as being about the enforcement of
an implied contractual non-disclosure provision); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 907
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (refusing to apply Totten where plaintiffs were not parties to an alleged contract but
claimed that “the performance of an alleged contract entered into by others would violate their statutory
rights”); ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 763 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (refusing to apply
Totten because it ‘‘applies [only] to actions where there is a secret espionage relationship between the
Plaintiff and the Government’’), vacated on other grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
137.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077–79 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
138.
See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842–43 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing cases for
the proposition that when the “Court has confronted a wrongly decided, unworkable precedent . . . , we
have chosen not to compound the original error, but to overrule the precedent”); Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (observing that, especially in cases
with constitutional implications, courts must bow “to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function”). Some scholars have made the same conflation. See Victor
Hanson, Extraordinary Rendition and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand,
33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629, 631–33 (2008) (discussing Totten as a “type of state secrets
privilege”).
139.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) (describing Totten as a case in
which the suit was dismissed without any inquiry into the evidence “since it was so obvious that the
action should never prevail over the privilege”).
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whenever the government claims that the “very subject matter” of the
litigation is a state secret.140
To say the least, the Reynolds Court’s reliance on Totten has created a
great deal of confusion, as Totten was never treated as a case about
evidentiary privileges. Totten is sometimes described as a principle of
“non-justiciability, akin to [the] political question doctrine.”141 It is better
understood as exemplifying a category of contracts that are not enforceable
either on public policy grounds or because of an implied term that the
agreement was to remain forever a secret.142
Even if Totten were not overbroad and even if it did not create
powerful disincentives for cooperation with the government, Totten itself
was clearly about a voluntary agreement with the government, as the
Jeppesen Dataplan panel correctly noted. Totten’s “plain language requires
[plaintiffs] (not Jeppesen) have an ‘agreement’ or ‘contract’ with the
government, and an ‘underst[anding]’ that ‘the lips of the other were to be
for ever sealed respecting the relation.’”143 As discussed above, the Totten
doctrine was revived and expanded in the more recent case of Tenet v. Doe.
But that expansion is not so capacious as to capture cases like Jeppesen
Dataplan, in which the plaintiffs did not enter into a voluntary relationship

140.
See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Reynolds and
Totten for the proposition that dismissal at the pleading stage can be appropriate in some SSP cases);
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal where the “very subject
matter” of plaintiff’s action was a state secret); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 907 (N.D.
Ill. 2006) (citing government arguments that dismissal is appropriate whenever the “very subject
matter” of a suit is a state secret); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(explaining that the government sought dismissal of the case because its “very subject matter” was a
state secret); Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment at 9–14, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (No. C-07-02798-JW) (arguing that the case could not proceed and must be dismissed at the
pleadings stage because state secrets were central to it).
141.
See Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1096 & n.7 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing cases for
the proposition that Totten is a non-justiciability doctrine); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540
(E.D. Va. 2006) (noting that the Totten bar is not a privilege but “is instead a rule of non-justiciability
that deprives courts of their ability to hear ‘suits against the Government based on covert espionage
agreements,’ even in the absence of a formal claim of privilege”).
142.
See Riordan, supra note 103, at 808 n.2 (describing Totten as being based on “an implied
covenant prohibiting the future disclosure of the existence or nature of the contract to third parties”).
Daniel Pines argues that Totten also can be understood as a version of the unclean hands doctrine.
Pines, Continuing Viability, supra note 104, at 1274. The basis for this claim seems to be language in
Totten stating that the publicity produced by an action for breach of a secret agreement “would itself be
a breach . . . and thus defeat a recovery.” Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). But this
language does not really sound like the language of unclean hands. In the alternative, Pines views
Totten as a product of the doctrine of separation of powers. Pines, Continuing Viability, supra note 104,
at 1276. But clearly this makes too bold a claim, negating any judicial authority to review
administrative claims relating to the need to maintain secrets.
143.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875)); see also Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 830 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding Totten inapplicable where plaintiff never entered into a contract with the
government).

TELMAN EIC MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/24/2012 10:32 AM

Intolerable Abuses

457

with the government.144 As late as 1988, Totten had been successfully
invoked in a grand total of six cases, all of which involved espionage
contracts.145
The Jeppesen Dataplan majority relies on Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Hawaii to claim that Totten has been expanded to apply outside
of the contractual context.146 The majority’s reliance on Weinberger is
misplaced. The case is neither a Totten case nor an SSP case. Plaintiffs in
Weinberger sought from the government a “‘Hypothetical Environmental
Impact Statement’” (EIS) pursuant to § 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),147 in connection with the
Navy’s plan to transfer ammunition to various locations on Oahu,
Hawaii.148 Plaintiffs were concerned that nuclear weapons would be
brought to the island, and sought to enjoin the building of new storage
facilities until an EIS was filed.149
The government took the position that no EIS was called for in the
circumstances and that, in any case, § 102(2)(C) of NEPA was subject to
the provisions of FOIA.150 The Court found that the national security
exception to FOIA was applicable in this context and excused the
government from its obligations under NEPA.151 The result is unsurprising:
NEPA is expressly subject to FOIA, and a FOIA exception clearly applies,
so plaintiffs were not entitled to the EIS that they sought.
The Court then noted that there have been “other circumstances” in
which the Court had held that “‘public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit’” that would lead inevitably “‘to the disclosure of matters which
the law itself regards as confidential.’”152 The Ninth Circuit uses this aside
as a basis to transform Weinberger into a Totten case, but the “other
circumstances” language makes clear that Totten provides only a loose
analogy and is not a ground for the Weinberger decision, which is the
straightforward product of the Court’s interpretation of two federal statutes.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the opinion
in order to make the point that the Court should have simply decided the

144.
See Jeppesen Dataplan, 563 F.3d at 1002 (noting that Tenet only prohibits suits that would
necessarily require the disclosure of plaintiffs’ secret agreements with the government).
145.
Riordan, supra note 103, at 807–09 (contending that in Guong v. United States, 860 F.2d
1063 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit extended the doctrine to include
contracts for sabotage as well as contracts for espionage).
146.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981)).
147.
See Weinberger, 454 U.S at 140 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006)).
148.
Id. at 141.
149.
Id. at 142.
150.
See id. at 141–43.
151.
Id. at 144–46.
152.
Id. at 146–47 (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
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case based on the FOIA exemption. Citation to Totten was unnecessary.153
One might argue that the fact that Blackmun found the reliance on Totten
worthy of comment suggests that Weinberger really is within the line of
Totten cases, but to do so ignores the fact that Totten is mentioned only in
an aside after the case had been decided on other grounds.
The Court cited Weinberger in Tenet, but only in order to show the
continued vitality of Totten in the face of arguments that Totten had been
displaced by the SSP.154 While the Jeppesen Dataplan majority uses
Weinberger to support its treatment of the Totten doctrine as a subspecies
of the SSP, the Court cited Weinberger in Tenet in a paragraph devoted to
distinguishing the two doctrines. Immediately after the citation to
Weinberger, the Court concluded. “Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be
read to have replaced the categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the
state secrets evidentiary privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend
upon clandestine spy relationships.”155 In short, while SSP cases point to
the Totten doctrine for support of the general proposition that courts may at
times have to recognize the government’s interest in protecting state
secrets, it has always done so while highlighting the differences between
Totten, which categorically bars certain kinds of suits, and the SSP, which
is an evidentiary privilege attended by a complex procedure and which
requires judicial balancing of the interests at stake in the litigation.
C. Totten Is a Very Limited Contracts Doctrine
The best evidence of the narrowness of Totten is provided by cases in
which former government employees sue the government and have their
claims dismissed based not on Totten but on the SSP.156 These cases
involve people who entered into contracts with the government, the details
of which the government claimed to be state secrets.157 As such, these cases
seem likely candidates for the Totten bar. Nonetheless, because the
153.
Id. at 149 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154.
See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (citing Weinberger’s reliance on Totten as evidence
of its “continued vitality”).
155.
Id. at 9–10.
156.
Daniel Pines, a strong supporter of the viability of the Totten doctrine, acknowledges that
employment cases are different and that there are good reasons not to invoke Totten in such cases.
Pines, Continuing Viability, supra note 104, at 1294–95.
157.
This Subpart is, of necessity, selective in the cases it discusses. As Laura Donohue has
highlighted, what we know of the SSP is really only the tip of the iceberg, because the majority of cases
in which the SSP is invoked do not result in published opinions in which the courts address SSP issues.
See Donohue, supra note 17, at 79–87 (pointing out the weaknesses of existing scholarship, which
focuses exclusively on published opinions). Still, Donohue’s research, which demonstrates that the SSP
is invoked more regularly than existing scholarship has realized, strengthens the argument in this
Subpart that the government routinely relies on the SSP rather than the Totten doctrine, even in cases
involving disputes with parties with whom the government has a contractual relationship.
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plaintiffs sued not to enforce their contracts with the government but to
raise claims of government misconduct in violation of federal statutory law,
the government invoked the SSP and not Totten in seeking dismissal of
their claims. While the line of cases discussed in this Subpart indicates that
courts are increasingly cowed by government demands that such claims be
dismissed without discovery, the important doctrinal point is that such
dismissals have always been based on the SSP and not on Totten. The aim
of this Subpart is to provide additional evidence that Totten, rarely invoked
even in the contractual context, could not possibly apply where plaintiffs
are victims of torts perpetrated by the government and its contractors.
It bears remarking that courts used to recognize the rights of
government employees to raise statutory claims against the government,
even if their jobs involved state secrets. In Molerio v. FBI, then-Judge
Scalia, on behalf of a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, dismissed a complaint raising statutory and constitutional issues
relating to the FBI’s decision not to hire Daniel Molerio as an agent.158
Although the government asserted the SSP in the case and sought dismissal
on that basis, it still participated in discovery, while redacting documents
that it claimed contained sensitive national security information.159 The
court dismissed Molerio’s Title VII claim and his Due Process claim on
“standard summary-judgment principles” without recourse to the SSP.160
Only Molerio’s First Amendment claim and his Privacy Act claims were
dismissed on SSP grounds,161 and that only after the court reviewed the
government’s classified declaration in camera and was convinced that the
FBI’s decision not to hire Mr. Molerio had nothing to do with his First
Amendment claim.162 Because of the SSP, that information relating to the
government’s affirmative defense could not be disclosed, but as then-Judge
Scalia put it, “we know that further activity in this case would involve an
attempt, however well intentioned, to convince the jury of a falsehood.”163
More evidence that statutory claims brought by former government
employees do not come up against the Totten bar is provided in Webster v.
Doe,164 in which plaintiff brought suit against then-CIA Director, William
Webster, claiming that he had been discharged from the CIA because of his
homosexuality.165 Webster sought dismissal of the claims on statutory

158.
Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 818–19, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
159.
Id. at 819.
160.
Id. at 822–24.
161.
Id. at 824–26.
162.
Id. at 825. The Privacy Act Claim required a showing of harm based on the First
Amendment claim and so failed when the First Amendment claim was dismissed. Id. at 826.
163.
Id. at 825.
164.
486 U.S. 592 (1988).
165.
See id. at 595–96.
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grounds.166 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that
plaintiff’s statutory claims were barred under the National Security Act.167
However, plaintiff’s constitutional claims were allowed to proceed.168 In
1988, apparently neither Totten nor the SSP required dismissal of suits
brought against the government by employees of the government’s
intelligence agencies even when their voluntary relationships with the
government might lead one to believe that the suits could be subject to
dismissal under Totten.
After 2000, courts grew more inclined to dismiss similar claims based
on the SSP after in camera review of classified declarations in support of
the government’s motion to dismiss.169 After the “War on Terror” began,
courts no longer found review of such materials necessary. It was now
enough for the government to simply make a plausible claim that state
secrets might be implicated, and all claims could be dismissed before
discovery.170 Still, the fact that the government went to the trouble of filing
classified declarations is significant, as that time-consuming procedure
would not be necessary if the claims simply could be dismissed on Totten
grounds.171
Tilden v. Tenet involved a gender discrimination suit against the CIA
Director.172 In response to plaintiff’s discovery requests, defendant invoked
the SSP and filed both a classified and an unclassified declaration in
support of the claims of privilege.173 The plaintiff did not object to the
court’s in camera review of the classified documents in support of the
classified declaration but did object to the fact that such review was ex
parte because both plaintiff and counsel had security clearances.174 The

166.
Id. at 597 (noting that Webster sought dismissal of the complaint based on § 102(c) of the
National Security Act, which precludes review of the CIA Director’s termination decisions).
167.
Id. at 601 (finding that § 102(c) of the National Security Act precluded review of the CIA
Director’s termination decisions to the extent that the Administrative Procedures Act grants him
discretion in such matters).
168.
Id. at 603–04 (concluding that Congress did not intend to “preclude consideration of
colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the [CIA] Director” and remanding for
further proceedings in the district court).
169.
See infra notes 172–177 and accompanying text (discussing Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d
623 (E.D. Va. 2000)).
170.
See infra notes 181–184 and accompanying text (discussing Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338
(4th Cir. 2005)).
171.
Reynolds requires that every assertion of the SSP be supported by a declaration based on
personal knowledge from the head of the department tasked with safeguarding the secret information at
issue. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953). Clearly, heads of agencies such as the FBI, the
CIA, and the National Security Agency have better things to do with their time than review case files so
that they can make declarations based on personal knowledge. If they could avoid doing so by invoking
Totten instead of the SSP, they would do so.
172.
Tilden, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
173.
Id. at 625.
174.
Id.
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court did not heed plaintiff’s objection and proceeded with its in camera
review ex parte.175 Having done so, the court dismissed the suit, despite the
fact that plaintiff’s counsel and plaintiff both had security clearances, on
the grounds that the court could not safeguard the national security secrets
that would be disclosed in the case.176
The insistence on ex parte review in Tilden is troubling. The court
dismissed a gender discrimination claim against the government after the
examination of evidence to which plaintiff was denied access despite
having security clearance. When plaintiff questioned the extent to which
the evidence in question actually implicated national security secrets, the
court responded with the “mosaic theory,”177 which the Jeppesen majority
also invoked.178 Under the mosaic theory, a court can refuse to provide a
party with access which is not itself classified, based on the possibility that
the disclosure of such information, when combined with other disclosures,
might jeopardize national security. As others have noted, when
overclassification is supplemented with the mosaic theory, we are
approaching a realm something like government immunity from suit.179
And yet, in Sterling v. Tenet,180 the Fourth Circuit went further still.
Sterling had served as a CIA operations officer for eight years. He brought
suit claiming that the CIA discriminated against him because he is African
American.181 The Director of the CIA filed both a classified and an
unclassified declaration explaining that Sterling could not prove his case
without forcing disclosure of secret information. The Fourth Circuit
approved of the district court’s practice of dismissing based on the CIA
Director’s confidential declaration without requiring even that the
175.
Id. at 626.
176.
Id. at 627.
177.
See id. at 627 n.1 (citing United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) for
the notion that information that “may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to
one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper
context”).
178.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that the SSP may be
invoked to bar disclosure of “seemingly innocuous information” if it is part of a mosaic, and the
government cannot force the government to disentangle the secret from the seemingly innocuous
information).
179.
See Note, supra note 125, at 578 (noting that the application of the SSP in a series of cases
challenging government surveillance of political activists minimizes government “liability incurred for
invasions of personal rights”); see also Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 1, 15–16 (2009) (characterizing the SSP has having “been transformed during the Bush years into
a de facto grant of immunity”); Michael P. Jensen, Note, Torture and Public Policy: Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. Allows “Extraordinary Rendition” Victims to Litigate Around State Secrets
Doctrine, 2010 BYU L. REV. 117, 128–130 (2010) (arguing that, although the Ninth Circuit Court’s
panel permitted the Mohamed plaintiffs to proceed with their suit, the standard announced in that
opinion still permits the SSP to be used as a sort of governmental immunity doctrine).
180.
Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005).
181.
Id. at 341.
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government produce any documentation underlying the declaration for in
camera, ex parte review.182 In Sterling, the court dismissed the case because
the government had come up with a good story—good enough to be
persuasive to a judge who neither looks at the evidence nor hears from the
other side183—about how litigation might involve the disclosure of state
secrets. Nonetheless, it is still noteworthy that, although Sterling was a case
involving an employment agreement that involved espionage for the United
States, the case was dismissed based on the SSP and not based on Totten.184
Totten simply has no application where the plaintiff does not seek court
enforcement of a secret agreement with the government.
Edmonds v. United States Department of Justice185 is similar. Sibel
Edmonds was a contract linguist hired by the FBI after the 9/11 attacks.186
Edmonds made various whistleblowing allegations to the FBI management
citing serious breaches in FBI security and poor translation work as a result
of the willful misconduct and gross incompetence of the people with whom
she worked.187 Shortly after she made such allegations, Edmonds’s
employment was terminated.188 She sued, citing violations of the Privacy
Act, and made constitutional claims alleging retaliatory termination in
violation of her First Amendment free speech rights and her Fifth
Amendment due process rights.189 The district court granted the
government’s motion for dismissal on SSP grounds after “ex parte, in
camera review” of classified declarations.190 Although the court discussed
Totten,191 it did so in the context of a historical discussion of the evolution
of the SSP going back to the trial of Aaron Burr.192 The remainder of the
opinion simply followed the procedure established in Reynolds for judicial
review of a government assertion of the SSP, and then evaluated whether
the successful invocation of the SSP required dismissal of the suit.193 In so

182.
Id. at 342–44.
183.
In order to overcome the need for in camera review of classified material, the government
need only show that there exists a reasonable danger that state secrets will be divulged in the process of
the litigation. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
184.
See Sterling, 416 F.3d at 348–39 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the suit on SSP
grounds).
185.
323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004).
186.
Id. at 67.
187.
Id. at 67–69.
188.
Id. at 69–70.
189.
Id. at 70.
190.
Id. at 81–82 (emphasis omitted).
191.
Id. at 71 (reviewing Totten almost exclusively through block quotation with almost no
discussion or analysis).
192.
See id. at 70–73 (discussing Reynolds, Totten, and United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.D. Va. 1807)).
193.
Id. at 73–81.
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doing, the court noted that both the nature of Edmonds’s employment and
“the events surrounding her termination” were state secrets.194
Sibel Edmonds entered into a voluntary employment agreement with
the government and sued upon the termination of that agreement. On its
face, the case seems ripe for summary dismissal without discovery on
Totten grounds. But the government went through the procedural
complexities of the SSP. This entailed in camera review of a detailed and
classified declaration of the U.S. Attorney General, based on personal
knowledge,195 as well as a supplemental declaration.196 Both declarations
set forth the reasons why Edmonds could not make out her prima facie case
without discovery of materials subject to the SSP and explained that the
government could not assert its affirmative defenses without disclosure of
such materials.197 If Totten were a bar to Edmonds’s claims, the
government could have saved itself the trouble.198 Totten did not bar
Edmonds’s claims because she did not sue to enforce her agreement with
the government.
Totten is a narrow doctrine. It applies only to suits to enforce secret
agreements with the government. It does not even apply to statutory or
constitutional claims brought by government employees or contractors. It
certainly has no application in cases, such as Jeppesen Dataplan, brought
by parties who never entered into a voluntary relationship with the
government.

194.
Id. at 79.
195.
See id. at 73, 79 (describing the Declaration of Attorney General John Ashcroft as being
based on personal knowledge); see also Memorandum on Practical Guidelines for Invoking the State
Secrets Privilege, U.S. Army (Apr. 24, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/armyssp.pdf (detailing a ten-week process involving dozens if not scores of people in the invocation of the
SSP by the U.S. Army).
196.
See Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
197.
See id.
198.
There is some evidence that the classified affidavits based on the personal knowledge of the
head of the department asserting the SSP are not actually based on personal knowledge. See Wells,
State Secrets, supra note 95, at 634 & n.50 (describing the declarations filed in SSP cases as “selfserving” and quoting Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 396 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
for the proposition that such declarations are usually prepared by subordinates and then are signed by
the departmental head “perfunctorily . . . without further consideration”); Note, supra note 125, at 572
n.18 (discussing a consensus among commentators that expectations of high-level review of assertions
of the privilege are unrealistic and citing to a case in which the Attorney General admitted to having
merely reviewed a subordinate’s recommendations). The solution is to abandon Reynolds’s requirement
that declarations in support of the SSP be made by heads of departments based on personal knowledge.
Officers of intelligence agencies should be able to assert the SSP on behalf of their agencies based on
their own, actual personal knowledge.
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ABUSE OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
In Reynolds, the survivors of civilians who were killed when a military
aircraft crashed sued the government for negligence in connection with the
crash.199 The government disclosed that the aircraft was testing new
electronic equipment200 but in its Answer denied that the plane crash had
been the product of any negligence.201 In the hopes of determining whether
the accident had been the product of some sort of negligence, the plaintiffs
sought the Air Force’s “official accident investigation report” pursuant to
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.202 The fight over that
accident report created the issue that brought Reynolds to the Supreme
Court.
Although the procedural history of the case suggests that the SSP was
not part of the case at the district court or circuit court level,203 the U.S.
Supreme Court treated the SSP as properly invoked204 and noted that the
government, while trying to avoid disclosure of the Air Force investigation
report, had offered to make available to plaintiffs three surviving
witnesses.205 The Reynolds Court held that the plaintiffs should have taken
the government up on its offer.206 Because these witnesses were available,
and because there was a “reasonable danger” that production of the report
would entail the disclosure of secret information relevant to national
security, the Court ruled that the government should not be forced to
produce the report.207

199.
200.

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 (1953).
See LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 1–2 (2006) (stating that public relations officer at plane’s air base told
reporters that the bomber that crashed had been on a “mission to test secret electronic equipment”).
201.
BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE: A MYSTERIOUS PLANE CRASH, A LANDMARK
SUPREME COURT CASE, AND THE RISE OF STATE SECRETS 104 (2008).
202.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
203.
Louis Fisher and Barry Siegel set out the full history of the Reynolds case, making clear that
the SSP was not properly invoked at the trial or appellate level. FISHER, supra note 200, at 29–91;
SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 99–156. Rather, at the district court level, the government withheld the Air
Force’s official accident investigation report based on the Housekeeping Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006),
and various hearsay objections. FISHER, supra note 200, at 36; see SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 106.
Before the Third Circuit, the government relied on the Housekeeping Statute and on “executive
immunity.” FISHER, supra note 200, at 64–69. When the government finally did assert the SSP, it
claimed that the accident report contained state secrets and was unreviewable. SIEGEL, supra note 201,
at 130. The district court rejected this argument and ordered production of the accident report. When the
government refused, the district court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs. Id. at 134.
204.
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–11 (setting forth requirements for invocation of SSP and finding
procedural steps to be met).
205.
Id. at 5.
206.
Id. at 11.
207.
See id. at 10–12.

TELMAN EIC MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/24/2012 10:32 AM

Intolerable Abuses

465

Reynolds was a scandal exacerbated by a government cover-up.208
When the government eventually declassified the report plaintiffs sought in
Reynolds, it contained no secret information relating to the electronic
equipment aboard the aircraft.209 One of the original Reynolds plaintiffs and
the children of two others petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court “for a writ of
error coram nobis.”210 That petition was denied.211 They then brought an
action in the district court where they first brought their claim, seeking to
have their settlement with the government set aside on the ground that it
was procured by fraud.212 The district court dismissed their action on the
ground that the report contained information that would have been
considered sensitive at the time,213 and the Third Circuit affirmed that
decision.214
In dismissing the claim, the Third Circuit explained how, aided by the
mosaic theory,215 seemingly innocuous details—in this case, the name of
the squadron to which the plane was attached, the fact that B-29s drop
bombs, and that they fly at an altitude above 20,000 feet—can reveal
sensitive information.216 The court noted that deference was due to the
government’s claim of secrecy, given “the near impossibility of
determining with any level of certainty what seemingly insignificant pieces
of information would have been of keen interest to a Soviet spy fifty years
ago.”217 But none of that is relevant if the government was claiming that the
need of secrecy was related to the electronic equipment on board the plane,

208.
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 200, (providing a complete history of Reynolds and criticizing
the post-Reynolds expansion of the privilege); SIEGEL, supra note 201 (retelling the story of the
Reynolds case and the plaintiffs’ and their survivors’ attempts to reveal the true causes of the military
plane crash that killed three civilians).
209.
See FISHER, supra note 200, at 167–68; Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 387 (3d Cir.
2005) (reporting that a daughter of one of the original plaintiffs discovered the declassified report in
2000); id. (recounting plaintiffs’ allegations that the declassified report contained no sensitive
information).
210.
Herring, 424 F.3d at 388.
211.
In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003); see SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 245–68 (providing a full
account of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decision to petition for a writ coram nobis and of the denial of the writ).
212.
Herring, 424 F.3d at 388.
213.
Id. at 389; see SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 275–82 (providing a full account of proceedings in
the district court).
214.
Herring, 424 F.3d at 388–89; see also SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 283–308 (providing a full
account of proceedings in the Third Circuit).
215.
See discussion infra notes 276–280.
216.
See Herring, 424 F.3d at 391–92 n.3. This information had been made public before the
litigation began. SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 286–87 (observing that the Soviets were already familiar
with the problem of engine fires aboard B-29 aircraft). Even if the information were not already public
before the accident, it was disclosed by the plane’s surviving co-pilot immediately after the crash. See
id. at 57–58 (citing newspaper interview with an Air Force public relations officer who quoted Captain
Moore as saying that the plane was flying at an altitude of 20,000 feet when the engine caught fire and
referencing “bomb bay doors”).
217.
Herring, 424 F.3d at 391.
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when no information relating to that information was contained in the
accident report.
The court ignored the fact that the investigation report contained
evidence supporting plaintiffs’ claim that government negligence in the
maintenance of its aircraft was the cause of their loved ones’ deaths.218 It
did not consider with specificity why certain details might be subject to the
privilege, like the fact that the plane that crashed had been out of
commission for 97 out of the 189 days preceding the fatal flight, or that the
plane had been declared unflyable just five days previous to the flight.219 It
never considered the possibility that the seemingly innocuous but
potentially revelatory details that it identified could have been redacted
before production of the investigation report, and that the possibility of
such redaction would have occurred to the government. Moreover, the
court ignored the obvious fraud in which the government had engaged. The
U.S. Supreme Court had not suppressed the accident report because it was
concerned that the government might be compelled to “reveal” that B-29s
fly bombing missions at above 20,000 feet. It suppressed the accident
report because the government had persuaded it that the accident report
contained information relevant to the aircraft’s secret mission, which had
necessitated the presence on board of the civilian contractors who died in
the crash.220 The report, however, did not contain the purported
information. The Supreme Court would have discovered that fact but for
the fraud perpetrated on the Court, a fraud facilitated by the Reynolds
approach, which does not require a court to inspect the documents
underlying an assertion of the SSP. With the benefit of the opportunity to
review the now-declassified report, the Court should have recognized the
fraud when it received the Reynolds survivors’ petition coram nobis in
2003.
The Reynolds Court permitted the government to use the SSP to do
precisely what court review is designed to prevent: protection of the
government from embarrassment rather than protection of national security.
The miscarriage of justice in Reynolds was not the result of bad luck. It was
218.
See Herring, 424 F.3d 384. The full Accident Investigation Report can be found in the
appendix to the court order approving settlement, beginning on page 10a. Stipulation of Counsel for
Compromise Settlement and Order of Court Approving Same 10a, Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d
384 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 9793), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/reynoldspetapp.pdf. The
report concludes that the most likely cause of the accident was failure to comply with a technical
maintenance order. Id. at 66a.
219.
SIEGEL, supra note 201, at 34.
220.
See FISHER, supra note 200, at 52 (referring to Maj. Gen Reginald C. Harmon’s claim in an
affidavit connected with the government’s assertion of privilege that disclosure would seriously hamper
“the development of highly technical and secret military equipment”); id. at 53 (discussing the claim of
privilege submitted by the Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, who warned that the plane
carried “confidential equipment” and so any disclosure of its mission, operation, or performance would
be prejudicial to the public interest).
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the result of bad law, and as this section argues, the law has gotten worse in
the nearly six decades since Reynolds was decided. Jeppesen Dataplan is
the fullest realization to date of the courts’ now habitual piling of progovernment inference upon inference until it becomes possible to dismiss
well-pleaded complaints based on hypothetical, affirmative defenses that a
civilian contractor might potentially assert were it ever required to answer
the complaint.
A. Reynolds Created a Faulty Methodology for Evaluating Assertions of
the SSP
The Reynolds Court was the first to misapply its own procedure for
determining whether the SSP applies.221 The Reynolds Court described the
SSP as calling for a balancing of state interests against the interests of the
litigants to proceed with their suits.222 But no balancing took place in
Reynolds,223 because the Court assumed that the report at issue would
contain military secrets, which it did not, and it assumed that plaintiffs
could get evidence of government negligence from other sources, which
they could not.224
Reynolds held that the invocation of the SSP is appropriate when it is
“possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged.”225 The Court then concluded, without reviewing the report, that
there certainly was “a reasonable danger that the accident investigation
report would contain references” to secret information.226 Because
witnesses were available who could provide information similar to that

221.
See FISHER, supra note 200, at 112 (quoting Justice Vinson’s admonition that judicial
control over evidence “cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers” but then pointing out
that a judge would never know if an executive officer acted capriciously under the procedure adopted in
Reynolds (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953))); William G. Weaver & Robert
M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 101 (2005) [hereinafter Weaver &
Pallitto, State Secrets] (contending that the “practical effect” of Reynolds has been to foster the very
abdication of control over evidence against which the Reynolds Court warned).
222.
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9 (declaring the need for a “formula of compromise”).
223.
Note, supra note 125, at 579 (observing that the Reynolds Court’s test is actually onedimensional, weighing only the possibility of harm to national security and ignoring potential harm to
litigants).
224.
See Wells, State Secrets, supra note 95, at 634 (contending that the Reynolds test favors
deference because “[a]sking courts to determine whether evidence that it often has not reviewed poses a
‘reasonable danger’ to national security requires speculation that weights the balance in favor of the
government”).
225.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
226.
Id.

TELMAN EIC MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

468

Alabama Law Review

2/24/2012 10:32 AM

[Vol. 63:3:429

contained in the report, the Court decided that it did not need to review the
report to see whether that “reasonable danger” was realized.227
In essence, there are two problems with Reynolds. First, the
“reasonable danger” standard is simply too easy a standard for the
government to satisfy, especially—as argued below—when coupled with
the myriad additional doctrines that all increase the likelihood that
government assertions of the SSP will be successful. As a result, the
government is encouraged to assert the SSP whenever it seeks to avoid the
possible adverse consequences of litigation. In addition, because courts feel
bound to allow the government an absolute privilege—regardless of the
consequences to the litigants—whenever there is only a reasonable danger
that disclosure could result in the release of state secrets, the SSP has
become a vehicle for judicial abdication. In the SSP context, courts do not
play their full constitutional role as the guarantors of individual rights,228
even of the rights of unpopular groups,229 such as suspected terrorists, and
they fail to constrain the federal government in the exercise of its limited
powers.
Second, courts cannot determine whether the assertion of the SSP is
appropriate without looking at the evidence underlying a claim of privilege.
In many cases, including Reynolds itself, the courts have allowed the
assertion of the privilege based only on a declaration submitted on behalf
of the government and claiming that the documents sought contain national
security secrets.230 Recently, that practice has often necessitated dismissal
of the suit. In cases like Jeppesen Dataplan, the assertion of the privilege
227.
See id. at 10 (observing that “there was a reasonable danger that the accident investigation
report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of
the mission”).
228.
Henry Hart famously referred to state courts as “the primary guarantors of constitutional
rights, and in many cases . . . the ultimate ones.” Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).
More recently, following tendencies in case law, scholars have characterized federal courts as serving
that role. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 47 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that an
essential function of the courts, by constitutional design, is to serve as guarantors of federal
constitutional rights); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043,
1074 (2010) (noting that “federal courts have earned recognition as stalwart and sometimes necessary
guarantors of constitutional rights”); C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger
Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 862, 932 n.300 (1985) (citing the Constitution and the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Statutes as sources of authority for the courts’ role as “guarantors of individual rights”).
The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (noting
that the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law”).
229.
On the role of courts in protecting the interests of unpopular individuals and groups, see
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
230.
See Chesney, supra note 20, at 1315–32 (indicating in an appendix that courts did not
undertake in camera review of documents other than declarations in at least thirty-four of eighty-nine
cases that resulted in published opinions on the SSP between 1951 and 2006, and in many other cases,
the review was limited).
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has lead to dismissal because the court was unable to imagine a defense
that would not implicate national security secrets. But if courts defer to
government assertions of the SSP because they think they lack institutional
competence to determine which disclosures really threaten national
security, why do courts trust themselves to imagine all possible affirmative
defenses? When these two problems are combined, Reynolds very quickly
becomes a formula for judicial abdication and thus opens the way for
intolerable abuses of the SSP.
B. Reynolds Has Been Expanded So As to Create Perverse Incentives for
Abuse of the SSP
Reynolds actually decided very little. The government in that case
asserted the SSP with respect to one document231 and quickly settled with
plaintiffs once the case was remanded.232 There was no question of
dismissing the action, and the Court’s decision to uphold the SSP was
clearly influenced by the fact that witnesses were available who could
testify as to the subject matter of the document subject to the privilege,
presumably without revealing state secrets.233 Reynolds tells us nothing
about the consequences in civil litigation when assertion of the SSP
forecloses an affirmative defense. It does not tell us how the SSP interacts
with statutes that give rise to causes of action against the government, or
tell us whether allegations of intentional government misconduct and
constitutional violations trump the SSP. Nor does it address when or
whether cases can be dismissed based on the SSP.
Subsequent SSP jurisprudence answers each of these questions in the
government’s favor and thus looks like a nine-level decision tree in which,
at each juncture, the courts make the decisions that most favor the
expansion of the SSP. The result is to allow courts to pile pro-government
inference on top of pro-government inference until, as occurred in Jeppesen
Dataplan, the plaintiffs’ case cannot proceed because the government
claims, but does not need to prove with actual evidence, that any argument
that the defendant might make in establishing its affirmative defenses
would implicate information subject to the SSP. Courts that dismiss cases
in which plaintiffs have already made a prima facie showing of government
torture based on their own speculation as to what arguments the defendant
will choose to make overestimate their own powers of prognostication

231.
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3–6 (observing that the only issue in the case was whether the
government was obligated to provide the Air Force’s “official accident investigation report”).
232.
See FISHER, supra note 200, at 117 (detailing the terms of the 1953 settlement agreement).
233.
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (finding the necessity of disclosure “minimized by an available
alternative”).
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while expanding the ability of the Executive Branch to act beyond the legal
scope of its powers.
The first two branches of the decision tree are the most fundamental.
First, in applying the SSP, courts do not differentiate torts claims from
contracts claims. Thus, courts allow Totten, which should only be relevant
to cases involving voluntary agreements with the government, to inform
their SSP analysis in cases involving plaintiffs alleging that they are the
victims of wholly unwanted attention from the government. While this
Article has contended that Totten is in itself overbroad, its logic clearly
cannot inform cases that do not involve agreements between the plaintiffs
and the government.
Second, courts ignore the fact that in some SSP cases, including
whistleblowing cases, discrimination cases, and FISA cases, Congress has
expressly given the courts power to adjudicate matters without any
suggestion that any evidentiary privilege ought to prevent them from doing
so. One can imagine a range of possibilities regarding what effect
congressional enactments ought to have on the applicability of a common
law evidentiary rule. Courts might have concluded that Congress granted
them jurisdiction to hear cases alleging government misconduct and that
the SSP should not impede the exercise of that jurisdiction. Because
Congress may be presumed to be aware of the SSP and chose not to create
an SSP exception to the exercise of the courts’ jurisdiction, courts
reasonably could have concluded that the SSP was not to apply to all cases
in which plaintiffs allege that government misconduct violates such
congressional enactments. In the alternative, one could imagine an
intermediate position that would entail close scrutiny of the congressional
record pertaining to the enactment of the relevant statutes. Or perhaps the
SSP should not bar allegations of constitutional violations by the
government, but should bar some or all statutory claims.
Courts have not embraced any of these options, nor have they
considered them. Instead, courts have generally taken the view that the SSP
is a bar to all claims, regardless of Congress’s intentions to create a remedy
for government misconduct, or of the significance of the statutory or
constitutional violations alleged.
As argued above, Reynolds arbitrarily established a “reasonable
danger” test that is too easy for the government to meet.234 That test has
become far easier to meet when coupled with other doctrines that have
arisen post-Reynolds. For example, the third government-friendly decision
consists of courts’ broad construction of the “reasonable danger” test,
upholding the government’s assertion of the SSP, not only when national
security might be endangered by the disclosure of information, but also
234.

See supra text accompanying notes 225–231.
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when disclosure poses a reasonable danger of disrupting foreign policy,235
thus blurring the line that separates protecting the country against
disclosure of national security secrets and protecting the government
against embarrassment.236 We likely will never know which motive was
foremost in the government’s motion to dismiss in Jeppesen Dataplan. As
plaintiffs’ submissions demonstrate, we know of the government’s
rendition program, not simply in broad outline but in substantial detail.237
Without litigating the case, it is impossible to know whether discovery is
possible without revealing state secrets, since the Ninth Circuit has refused
to order the district court to do the hard work of separating information that
must be disclosed, or that can be disclosed in redacted form and under seal,
from information that is in all circumstances covered by the SSP.238
Fourth, courts decide whether to allow the assertion of the SSP in ex
parte proceedings. In most circumstances, this is not surprising, because, as
the Reynolds Court noted, courts should not police the SSP in a way that
would defeat its purpose by revealing state secrets.239 However, in some
cases, as in the various cases involving suits against the government by
former government employees alleging some form of unlawful
discrimination,240 the plaintiffs themselves have security clearance and so
national security concerns do not obviously justify plaintiffs’ exclusion
from a hearing on the SSP. While the identity of certain government agents
may be classified, plaintiffs in such cases already have access to that
information. They know the people they have accused of misconduct. In
235.
See Republic of China v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551, 556 (D. Md. 1956)
(permitting non-disclosure where the government gave as the only grounds for asserting the privilege its
desire to avoid exacerbation of tensions arising from British recognition of the People’s Republic of
China); see also Note, supra note 125, at 574 (noting that the “reasonable danger” standard does not
refer to the “likelihood of any harm . . . occurring” and does not evaluate the sensitivity of the
information subject to the privilege); id. at 579 (“[A]lmost any information—economic, demographic,
even meteorological—if disclosed, could be useful to a foreign adversary and potentially prejudicial to
the nation’s security.”).
236.
See Griswold, supra note 70, at A25 (reflecting his personal experience that “principal
concern of the classifiers is . . . with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another”).
237.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1101–31 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Hawkins, J., dissenting) (providing a summary of the 1,800 pages of supporting documents submitted
with the complaint).
238.
See id. at 1101 (calling for a remand to the district court in order to allow the district court to
determine “what evidence is privileged and whether any such evidence is indispensable” to plaintiffs’
claims or to the defendant’s affirmative defenses).
239.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (noting that the court must determine
whether the circumstances justify a claim of privilege “without forcing . . . disclosure of the very thing
the privilege is . . . to protect”).
240.
See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005) (involving a plaintiff who had been
a CIA operations officer); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004)
(involving a plaintiff who was an FBI translator); Tenenbaum v. Simonini, No. 09-10612, 2009 WL
2222933 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (involving a plaintiff who was an employee of the U.S. Army Automotive
Armaments Command); Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Va. 2000) (involving a CIA
employee).
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other cases, courts have insisted on proceeding ex parte even where
plaintiff retains security-cleared counsel.241 Only on a few occasions have
courts appointed security-cleared counsel to plaintiffs who do not
themselves have security clearance.242
Fifth, Reynolds itself exemplifies a fatal flaw of the SSP in that courts
often refuse to examine documentary evidence submitted in support of
classified declarations filed in connection with assertions of the SSP. This
aspect of Reynolds has properly been identified as an abdication of judicial
duties.243 If the Reynolds Court had actually reviewed the accident report
that the government claimed contained information relevant to national
security, it would have discovered that the report contained limited
information that easily could have been redacted, while still giving
plaintiffs the evidence they sought of government negligence in the
maintenance of the aircraft that crashed.244 As H. Thomas Wells, Jr.,
speaking on behalf of the American Bar Association, put it in recent
congressional testimony,
Courts are charged with applying the law to facts in cases, not
taking assertions as a matter of faith. It is as big a mistake for them
to rule on the merits in a vacuum as it is for them to assess the need
for secrecy without first examining the evidence.245
Evidence from FOIA cases suggests that, when courts actually do
review documents underlying government claims that disclosure of such
documents would compromise national security, such claims are sometimes
without basis.246 Occasionally, though not in every case, when the
241.
See Tilden, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
242.
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2004) (requiring
that petitioners’ counsel receive “necessary security clearance” to gain access to classified information
relevant to cases); Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2004) (requiring that
counsel have “security clearance at the level appropriate for the level of knowledge the Government
believes is possessed by the detainee”); cf. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 275–76
(4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (suggesting that parties might identify alternative counsel who could receive
necessary security clearance should present counsel be unable to obtain such clearance). But see
Donohue, supra note 17, at 174–75 (citing Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Horn v. Huddle, No. 941756, at 7–8 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004)) (discussing Horn v. Huddle, where the court denied plaintiff’s
motion to provide security clearance for one of plaintiff’s attorneys).
243.
See FISHER, supra note 200, at 253 (characterizing this aspect of the opinion as “incoherent,
contradictory, and tilted away from the rights of private citizens and fair procedures and supportive of
arbitrary executive power”).
244.
See discussion supra accompanying notes 208–220.
245.
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 4 (2008) [hereinafter Wells Congressional Testimony] (statement of H. Thomas Wells, Jr.,
President-Elect, American Bar Association).
246.
See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 164–65 (recounting a case in which the CIA claimed that it
could neither affirm nor deny the existence of previously disclosed biographies of Eastern European
leaders).
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government is caught in a lie, it is forced to back down from its claim that
disclosure would threaten national security.247 It follows that if the
government knew that its claims of secrecy would be subject to scrupulous
review, the government would be far more selective in asserting the SSP.
Undeterred, lower courts routinely refuse to review classified
information that purportedly supports government assertions of the
privilege based on concerns that court review itself poses a danger of
disclosure.248 In Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp.,249 plaintiff was
the administrator of the estate of a crewman who was killed aboard a U.S.
naval vessel when it was struck by two Iraqi missiles while patrolling the
Persian Gulf.250 The suit alleged that the American casualties were caused
by the defendants’ negligence in designing, manufacturing, testing, and
marketing the ship’s anti-missile defense system.251 Reviewing only the
declaration of the Secretary of the Navy submitted in support of the
government’s assertion of the SSP, the trial court dismissed Zuckerbraun’s
claims, finding that he could not make out his claims without access to
information barred from disclosure.252 The Second Circuit affirmed and
rejected plaintiff’s request for in camera review.253 Such review was
unnecessary in this case, the court found, because any documents that the
government would produce would of necessity either be subject to the
247.
Compare id. at 174–75 (describing how after the appointment of a special master, the
government released 85% of the documents that it claimed were exempt from FOIA in Vaughn v.
Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), with id. at 165 (noting that the government ultimately was
permitted to withhold its biographies of Eastern European leaders despite the fact that some of them had
already been disclosed). In one SSP case, when the court learned that the government had been
mistaken about one of the defendants’ under cover status and had concealed the extent of its knowledge
of that mistake, the court reinstated plaintiff’s claims against the defendant and also treated the
government’s subsequent invocations of the SSP with skepticism, eventually forcing the government
into a settlement ending fifteen years of litigation. See Donohue, supra note 17, at 175–84 (discussing
Horn v. Huddle); Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238, 243 (D.D.C. 2010) (approving stipulation
of dismissal and payment of $3 million to plaintiff). In Crater Corp., see infra text accompanying notes
366–389, the district court expressed skepticism that all 26,000 documents responsive to plaintiffs’
discovery requests, including publicly-available court records, were as the government claimed, subject
to the SSP, but nonetheless dismissed most of plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that it would be unable to
make out its prima facie case without documents subject to the SSP. Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
No. 4:98CV00913 ERW, 2004 WL 3609347, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 19, 2004), rev’d by 423 F.3d 1260
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that state secrets privilege was properly invoked but dismissal was premature).
In reviewing that determination, the Federal Circuit did not examine the 26,000 documents at issue.
Davida H. Isaacs & Robert M. Farley, Privilege-Wise and Patent (and Trade Secret) Foolish? How the
Courts’ Misapplication of the Military and State Secrets Privilege Violates the Constitution and
Endangers National Security, 24 BERK. TECH L.J. 785, 797 & n.52 (2009).
248.
See Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1495–96 (C.D. Cal. 1993);
Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (D. Conn. 1990); Chesney, supra
note 20, at 1315–32.
249.
935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991).
250.
Id. at 545.
251.
Id. at 545–46.
252.
Id. at 546.
253.
Id. at 548.
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privilege or irrelevant.254 Any other evidence plaintiff might introduce
“would of necessity be of no greater reliability than dockside rumor, if
that.”255
However, in another case, Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp.,256
arising out of the same incident, plaintiffs introduced “2,500 pages of
affidavits and other documents” substantiating their claims of
negligence.257 In affirming dismissal based on the SSP, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that plaintiffs’ submissions amounted to far more than
“dockside rumor.”258 Nevertheless, based on its review of plaintiffs’
submissions, the same declaration submitted in Zuckerbraun, and the
Navy’s investigation report, the court confidently concluded that the case
must be dismissed because plaintiffs could not establish their claim without
threatening disclosure of state secrets.259 Courts thus insist on dismissing
claims rather than proceeding with discovery and letting justice take its
course even in the face of evidence of their inability to predict what kinds
of non-classified evidence plaintiffs might introduce.
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes260 is instructive in this regard. The
district court granted the government’s motion to intervene in a tortious
interference case, upheld the government’s assertion of the SSP, and
dismissed the suit.261 A panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal
and remanded the case for trial to determine whether or not plaintiff could
make out a prima facie case without recourse to information subject to the
SSP.262 The en banc court reinstated the dismissal. Writing in dissent,
Judge Phillips remarked on the inappropriateness of an appellate court
determining “the probable course of trial” and warned that the questionable
practice “invites repetition in future cases.”263 In a separate dissent, Judge
Murnaghan, who authored the panel opinion, remarked on the danger that
“[a]ny litigant . . . whose proof is hampered by the invocation of state
secrets can hereafter be turned away from his efforts to obtain justice on the

254.
case”).
255.
256.
1992).
257.
258.
1991)).
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See id. at 548 (finding that in camera review “would . . . not alter the disposition of the
Id.
973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on reh’g, 973 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1142 (quoting Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir.
Id. at 1143.
635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
See id. at 281.
Id.
Id. at 282 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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questionable grounds that, for reasons as to which he must remain
uninformed, he might stumble intrusively into a protected area.”264
The general operative principle informing these decisions is that it is
often impossible to separate classified and unclassified information that
might arise in the course of litigation.265 In response to plaintiffs’
contention in Bareford that dismissal was an unduly harsh remedy given
the other options, the court insisted that “[n]o intermediate solution . . . can
fully protect the United States’ interest in keeping its state secrets
undisclosed.”266 This perspective is well articulated by Daniel Pines, a CIA
attorney who has written on the SSP:
Sealed proceedings are also not fool-proof. Listening devices
can be placed inside courtrooms during times when the courtroom
is open for public proceedings. Foreign intelligence services can
monitor who comes in and out of courtrooms, or even courthouses,
in an attempt to identify covert operatives. Court files and
computers can be breached to discover classified information. And
court personnel, as well as lawyers and their staffs, are always
susceptible to innocent slips of the tongue, as well as to
manipulation or inducement by persons interested in the classified
information at issue.267
Pines’s concerns are probably sufficient to satisfy the Reynolds Court’s
“reasonable likelihood” test, but it might be a close call. After all, Pines’s
scholarship is richly footnoted, but the paragraph provided above cites to
no authority except for one lonely court case in which the court, like Pines,
raised only the hypothetical possibility that a court could be the source of a
leak of national security information.268
As of May 2009, at least 2.4 million people had security clearance in
the United States.269 It is hard to see why federal judges should be

264.
Id. at 282–83 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
265.
See Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
allow testimony by people with access to classified information even on non-classified matters because
“privileged and non-privileged material are inextricably linked”).
266.
Id. Bareford exemplifies a court’s tendency to assume that some danger will arise and to
preclude the introduction of evidence rather than allowing its introduction in camera and then
addressing issues as they arise. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir.
1985) (refusing to allow plaintiffs to produce a government official to speak on non-classified matters
based on the “considerable danger” that either the direct testimony or cross-examination would lead to
leaks of classified information).
267.
Pines, Continuing Viability, supra note 104, at 1297.
268.
See id. at 1297 n.103 (“‘Protective orders cannot prevent inadvertent disclosure . . . .’”
(quoting Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978))).
269.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-488, PERSONAL SECURITY CLEARANCES:
AN OUTCOME-FOCUSED STRATEGY IS NEEDED TO GUIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMED
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blackballed from such a non-exclusive club. As the Third Circuit noted in
Reynolds,
The judges of the United States are public officers whose
responsibility under the Constitution is just as great as that of the
heads of the executive departments. When Government documents
are submitted to them in camera under a claim of privilege the
judges may be depended upon to protect with the greatest of care
the public interest in preventing the disclosure of matters which
may fairly be characterized as privileged.270
There appears to be no evidence that courts have ever been responsible for
the leaks of national security secrets. On the contrary, each year, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a special court established
under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),271 reviews
thousands of applications for secret warrants.272 There has never been a
leak of classified information because of judicial involvement in this
intelligence-gathering process. In addition, the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA), enacted in 1980, allows for precisely the sort of in
camera review and proceedings in criminal cases that Pines contends would
pose a risk of public disclosure of national security secrets.273 There is no
evidence that any court operating under CIPA has ever publicly
disseminated any secret information disclosed in such in camera
proceedings.
Moreover, Pines’s argument ignores important post-Reynolds
developments, including the CIPA and Congress’s revision of FOIA in
1974 to encourage judicial review of executive claims of secrecy.274 As the
CLEARANCE PROCESS 1 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/289932.pdf. This number
does not include “some of those with clearances who work in areas of national intelligence.” Id.
270.
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951) (emphasis omitted) rev’d by
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
271.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) The creation of the FISC is authorized under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1803(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
272.
In 2008, for example, the government made over 2,000 applications to engage in electronic
surveillance, or physical searches, or both. The FISC approved all but one of these applications. Letter
of Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to Congressional Leaders 1–2 (May 14, 2009), available
at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/05/doj-report-to-congress-on-fisa-and-nsls.pdf.
Other FISA reports are available from the Federation of American Scientists’ website. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/#rept (last updated May 26, 2011).
273.
See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (2006) (mandating in
camera proceedings to determine admissibility of classified information).
274.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing that the court must review
claims of exemptions to FOIA de novo and may examine agency records in camera to determine
whether the agency can meet its burden to sustain its action seeking an exemption from its obligations
under FOIA).
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D.C. Circuit noted in 1978, in amending FOIA, Congress “stressed the
need for an objective, independent judicial determination, and insisted that
judges could be trusted to approach the national security determinations,
with common sense, and without jeopardy to national security.”275
Congress has entrusted the courts with the authority to review government
submissions and to make independent determinations about the dangers
disclosures would pose to national security.276
Sixth, in some SSP cases, there is significant question whether the
information at issue is secret. Courts upholding the SSP have repeatedly
done so in reliance on the so-called “mosaic theory.” This is “the notion
that the government may withhold otherwise trivial or innocuous
information because it might prove dangerous if combined with other
information by a knowledgeable actor (especially a hostile intelligence
agency).”277 Courts have frequently invoked the mosaic theory in support
of government assertions of the SSP.278 As a result, the SSP can be invoked
to prevent the disclosure of information that is not even classified if the
government can persuade the court that there is a reasonable danger that the
disclosure of such unclassified information, combined with other
information, which may be classified, would somehow compromise
national security. Resort to mosaic theory has expanded in the twenty-first
century,279 even as some courts have recognized the risks attendant to the
theory.280

275.
Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
276.
See id. at 1209–10 (quoting Senator Baker as favoring the “minimal risks that a Federal
judge might disclose legitimate national security information” over the “potential for mischief and
criminal activity under the cloak of secrecy”); id. at 1209 n.35 (quoting Senator Muskie as regarding
federal judges as equally able to sort out “valid from invalid claims of executive privilege” in both
criminal proceedings and in “matters allegedly connected to the conduct of foreign policy”).
277.
Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 845, 846 (2006). For a FOIA case involving mosaic theory, see, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 921–22, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (relying on mosaic theory in denying
non-governmental organization (NGO) access to list of names of 1000 individuals detained in post-9/11
round-ups).
278.
See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Air
Force’s claim of privilege was not overbroad in that the mosaic theory justified application of the SSP
to both classified and unclassified information); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(likening foreign intelligence gathering in the computer age “to the construction of a mosaic” and
noting that “[t]housands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be analyzed and
fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate”); Edmonds v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51,
58–59 & n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
279.
See David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005) (contending that the mosaic theory has been applied by
courts post 9/11 in ways that are unfalsifiable, inconsistent with both FOIA’s text and purpose, and
“susceptible [of] abuse,” and arguing “for greater judicial scrutiny of mosaic theory claims”).
280.
See e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 709 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the
speculation involved in the mosaic theory should not become “the basis for . . . drastic restriction of the
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Seventh, information made public but still classified is treated as
classified and subject to the SSP. Indeed, the government can still claim
that information that it has previously disclosed is classified and
unavailable to litigants.281 The D.C. Circuit long ago held that the
government is not estopped from asserting the SSP selectively if it
concludes that disclosure is permissible in one case but not another.282 Such
a rule permits the Executive to protect itself by refusing to provide
information in one case while using the same information to its advantage
in separate litigation when disclosure suits its purposes.283
The ability of the government to assert that information already made
public is still classified is crucial in cases such as Jeppesen Dataplan in
which plaintiffs required no discovery from the government in order to
establish a factual basis for their claims. As early as 2006, the U.S.
government disclosed the fact that it operated an extraordinary rendition
program in connection with the “War on Terror.”284 An investigation into
the complicity of European governments in the United States’

public’s First Amendment rights”); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Dep’t of Def., 831 F.2d 441, 445 (3d
Cir. 1987) (identifying a “‘slippery slope,’ problem” in the mosaic theory).
281.
This occurred in Wilson v. Central Intelligence Agency, 586 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2009). That
case involved the CIA’s insistence on redacting from Valerie Plame Wilson’s memoir, Fair Game: My
Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House (2007), any reference to her pre-2002 service in the CIA
on the ground that such information remained classified. Id. at 173–74. Ms. Wilson argued that the CIA
should be estopped from denying that her service pre-dated 2002 because it had itself disclosed the
dates of her service in a letter to her that was published in the Congressional Record. Id. at 187–91. The
Second Circuit ruled unanimously that, to paraphrase the concurring opinion of Judge Katzmann, Ms.
Wilson’s dates of service were originally properly classified, were never officially declassified, and
were never officially disclosed by the CIA. That being the case, the court had no power to order their
publication. Id. at 196 (Katzmann, J., concurring); see also id. at 174 n.2 (quoting Judge Katzmann’s
language as signaling his agreement with the main opinion). A similar outcome resulted from the
National Security Archives’ attempts to get CIA biographies of Eastern European leaders in Nat’l Sec.
Archives v. CIA, No. 99-1160 (D.D.C. July 31, 2000). Despite the court’s finding that “national security
can only be harmed by the lack of trust engendered by a government denial of information that it has
already admitted,” the court ultimately permitted the government to withhold the biographies whose
existence it had acknowledged. Fuchs, supra note 16, at 165.
282.
See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (allowing the government to assert the
SSP to prevent plaintiffs from discovering the subjects of government surveillance although the
government had admitted to such surveillance in a similar case).
283.
Thus, for example, even while the government refused to comply with FOIA requests and
disclose the number of investigations undertaken by the FBI pursuant to § 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act, the Department of Justice declassified a memorandum indicating that the FBI had never used its
power under that section. See Fuchs, supra note 16, at 155. The case of Valerie Plame Wilson provides
more evidence that the government uses doctrines of state secrecy to both shield itself from liability or
embarrassment and as a political weapon that it unsheathes at will. In their suit against Lewis Libby, the
Wilsons claimed that Libby had informed reporter Robert Novak of Valerie Plame Wilson’s position as
a CIA agent in order to destroy her career in retaliation for Joseph Wilson’s criticisms of the veracity of
one of the Bush Administration’s key factual claims underlying its justification for the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
284.
See Sadat, supra note 5, at 1200 (citing President Bush’s first public acknowledgment of the
program, President’s Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569, 1570 (Sept.
6, 2006)).
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extraordinary rendition program resulted in a report of the European
Parliament, which provides extensive details about the program.285
Plaintiffs provided further details derived from disclosures by the
Swedish286 and Egyptian governments287 of their respective roles in the
extraordinary rendition program. On July 25, 2007, the United Kingdom
Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee published a report that
fully corroborated the allegations in the Complaint relating to Mr. alRawi.288 Despite these disclosures, courts still treat the U.S. extraordinary
rendition program as a state secret, the details of which may not be
disclosed in litigation.289
Eighth, the government increasingly does not merely assert the
privilege in order to escape its discovery obligations; it seeks pre-discovery
dismissal of the entire case.290 If the SSP operates like an evidentiary
privilege, making the evidence unavailable, it may well be the case that
dismissal is necessary on SSP grounds when plaintiff’s lack of access to
secret evidence prevents her from making out a prima facie case.291 That
285.
Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 380.593v04-00 4 (2006) (cited in
Sadat, supra note 5, at 1204 n.18).
286.
See Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 232 (“The [Office of the Parliamentary] Ombudsman [of
the Swedish Government’s] report concluded that U.S. and Egyptian officials involved in the rendition
had violated Swedish criminal law by subjecting Mr. Agiza to ‘degrading and humiliating treatment’
and by exercising police powers on Swedish soil. And the [Swedish Parliament’s] Standing Committee
on the Constitution concluded that Swedish government actions violated Swedish immigration laws
prohibiting the transfer of anyone from Sweden to a country where there is a substantial likelihood of
his being subjected to torture.”).
287.
See id. at ¶ 37 (“On May 15, 2005, the Egyptian Prime Minister stated publicly that Egypt
had assisted the United States in the rendition of sixty to seventy terrorist suspects since the September
11 attacks.”).
288.
Id. at ¶ 233.
289.
See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that, in
order to prevail in court, plaintiff would need far more specific evidence of defendants’ roles in the
extraordinary rendition program acknowledged by U.S. officials than had been made publicly
available).
290.
See, e.g., id. at 310–11 (affirming prediscovery dismissal on state secrets grounds of suit
brought by German national who alleged that U.S. agents and others had subjected him to torture,
unlawful detention, and inhumane treatment); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348–49 (4th Cir. 2005)
(affirming prediscovery dismissal on state secrets grounds of suit against Central Intelligence Agency
for race discrimination under Title VII); Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004)
(affirming prediscovery dismissal on state secrets grounds in religious discrimination case); Farnsworth
Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (affirming prediscovery dismissal
because disclosure of state secrets at trial would have been inevitable); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F.
Supp. 2d 899, 917–20 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (dismissing before discovery challenge to National Security
Agency’s warrantless wiretapping program on state secrets grounds); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing before discovery wrongful termination suit
against Federal Bureau of Investigation on state secrets grounds).
291.
That would be the case, for example, in surveillance cases because plaintiffs are deprived of
standing to challenge the government’s warrantless wiretapping programs unless they can first establish
that they were victims of such a government program. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (remanding for dismissal after finding that the plaintiffs could not
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would seem to be the law in the Ninth Circuit even if plaintiff’s lack of
access to vital evidence is wholly fanciful.292
However, in cases like Jeppesen Dataplan, plaintiff can make out a
prima facie claim without any discovery, and the court still dismisses based
on speculation. The court cannot know before the defendant has answered
the complaint what state secrets will be implicated in the case because it
cannot yet know what defenses might be raised. As the Jeppesen Dataplan
panel observed, the court cannot “determine whether the parties will be
able to establish their cases without use of privileged evidence without also
knowing what non-privileged evidence they will marshal.”293 The panel
recognized the impropriety of dismissal “at the pleadings stage on the basis
of an evidentiary privilege that must be invoked during discovery or at
trial.”294
In fact, it could not be that Jeppesen could not defend itself without
seeking to introduce evidence subject to the privilege. According to Daniel
Pines, none of the conduct alleged in Jeppesen Dataplan is clearly
illegal.295 In Pines’s view, Jeppesen could thus concede all of the factual
allegations in the complaint and still argue that, as a matter of law, it is not
liable for any harm suffered by plaintiffs.296 Having the case litigated on
establish their standing because they were barred from discovery under the SSP); Halkin v. Helms, 690
F.2d 977, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that without access to evidence subject to the SSP, plaintiffs
lack standing to seek relief); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (barring plaintiffs from
seeking discovery relating to a government-acknowledged surveillance program and thus preventing
them from proving that their communications had been intercepted); Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d 899
(dismissing for lack of standing claim brought by telephone subscribers alleging that their records had
been illegally disclosed to the National Security Agency).
292.
In In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008),
plaintiffs were a non-profit organization, and its attorneys sought to establish their standing to challenge
surveillance in violation of FISA. Through an inadvertent government disclosure, plaintiffs came into
possession of a classified document (the “sealed document”) that would apparently have established
that plaintiffs were “aggrieved persons” with standing to bring claims against government agencies for
FISA violations. Id. at 1130. However, because plaintiffs were not permitted to rely on the sealed
document to establish their status as aggrieved persons, id. at 1130–31; see Al-Haramain Islamic
Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007), they were unable to establish their standing,
and their claims were dismissed. In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. In short, even though plaintiffs
could prove that they had been subject to surveillance and even though the government had
acknowledged a warrantless wiretapping program that was not in conformity with FISA, id. at 1113–14,
the court had to blind itself to those facts and dismiss the case. The full story of the Bush
Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program is told in an official report, OFFICES OF INSPECTORS
GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY,
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/IGTSP
Report090710.pdf.
293.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009).
294.
Id.
295.
See Pines, Rendition Operations, supra note 5, at 523 (contending that the U.S.
extraordinary rendition program violates few if any currently existing U.S. laws and that the remedies
for such violations as might exist are extremely limited).
296.
Id. at 580.
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that basis would be a very important exercise and would offer courts the
opportunity to clarify a troublesome area of law that various abstention
doctrines have prevented the courts from addressing. If the courts in the
end reject Pines’s argument, we would at least know what the law is, and
there would be no harm to Jeppesen, as its motion for judgment on the
pleadings would simply be rejected and the case could then proceed to
discovery, the appropriate stage for assertions of various privileges.
Finally, ignoring the Reynolds court’s comparison of the SSP to
evidentiary privileges such as that against self-incrimination, courts have
allowed dismissal of suits such as Jeppesen Dataplan in which plaintiffs do
not need to rely on evidence subject to the privilege in order to make out
their prima facie case.297 Both courts and Congress have recognized the
proper response to the assertion of the SSP: It simply makes the evidence
unavailable and the case proceeds without it.298 And yet, in Jeppesen
Dataplan, the Ninth Circuit majority found that Reynolds requires
dismissal when the SSP makes it impossible for the government or its
contractors to defend against the plaintiffs’ claims.299
Reynolds itself certainly does not require such a result. It could not, as
it was not a case in which the government sought dismissal of a claim.
Moreover, the evidence at issue in Reynolds related to plaintiffs’ claims
and not to any possible government defense. Still, the Reynolds Court
suggested that suits against the government constitute an exception to
sovereign immunity and claimed that where the government creates such
an exception, it controls the conditions under which it subjects itself to
suit.300 But Reynolds overlooks the fact that it was Congress that created
the exception to sovereign immunity at issue in Reynolds, as well as other
exceptions that are at issue in other SSP cases. Where Congress creates the
exception, to permit the Executive to determine the scope of that exception
violates the principle of checks and balances that is crucial to our
constitutional design.301

297.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(assuming that plaintiffs could make out their prima facie case without relying on evidence subject to
the privilege).
298.
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Advisory Committee’s Note to
Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509(e), 56 F.R.D. 183, 254 (1973).
299.
Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1087–90.
300.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
301.
See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988) (remarking on the district courts’ ability to
control the discovery process and to balance one party’s need for access to proof in support of colorable
claims against the government’s need to protect confidentiality); FISHER, supra note 200, at 258
(rejecting broad judicial deference to the Executive Branch as undermining “the judiciary’s duty to
assure fairness in the courtroom and to decide what evidence may be introduced”); Weaver & Pallitto,
State Secrets, supra note 221, at 90 (contending that the SSP prevents courts from exercising their
constitutional duty to oversee the Executive).
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IV. FIXING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
In 2008, Senator Ted Kennedy and twelve co-sponsors introduced a
bill to reform the SSP, the State Secrets Protection Act (SSPA).302
Although the SSPA garnered the support of the American Civil Liberties
Union, which has played a leading role in criticizing the government’s use
of the SSP,303 others contended that it would have amended the current SSP
regime only slightly.304 Nonetheless, the Bush Administration opposed the
SSPA and prevented it from being enacted.305 Although the SSPA was
reintroduced in the 111th Congress, no action was taken on it, and SSP
reform now seems to be safely off the congressional agenda. The SSPA
was a valiant effort that could have made abuse of the SSP more difficult.
However, this Article contends that the complexities of the SSP cannot be
adequately addressed through congressional legislation. Moreover,
although legislation could certainly help to nudge courts in the right
direction, no such legislation is necessary, as courts already possess the
power and authority to restore the SSP to its proper and limited scope.
This final Part makes three arguments. First, the Part explains why,
contrary to the Jeppesen Dataplan majority, courts are the appropriate
place to address claims of government conduct. Second, courts should
follow Reynolds and treat the SSP as an evidentiary privilege. As such, if
the plaintiff is unable to make out her prima facie claim because vital
information is unavailable, she may not be able to survive a motion to
dismiss. However, if the government (or its contractor) cannot assert an
affirmative defense because of the SSP, the defendant might be subject to a
successful motion for judgment on the pleadings, which would result in a
judgment for the plaintiff.
In the final Subpart, the Article contends that it should almost never be
necessary to dismiss a case because of the assertion of the SSP. Courts can
hold in camera trials, appoint counsel with security clearance or appoint a
special master to sort out what evidence gets in. It is time for courts to
recognize in the SSP context, as they have in other contexts, that holding

302.
See Donohue, supra note 17, at 79 n.4.
303.
See State Secrets Protection Act, Hearing on H.R. 5607 Before the House Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 8–9 (July 31, 2008) (statement of Steven R. Shapiro,
Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/pdf/Shapiro080731.pdf (expressing the ACLU’s support for the SSPA).
304.
See Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving
Accountability, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 12–13 (Feb. 13, 2008) (statement of Louis
Fisher) (noting ways in which, in Mr. Fisher’s view, the SSPA would be overly protective of executive
power).
305.
See Letter from Michael Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, to Senator Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/
ola/views-letters/110-2/03-31-08-ag-ltr-re-s2533-state-secrets.pdf [hereinafter Mukasey Letter].
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the government accountable for its actions is at least as important to a
functioning democracy as the protection of state secrets. In so doing, courts
need not balance litigants’ rights against national security interests. Courts
can protect national security interests without dismissing cases because
they have the means in almost all cases to find mechanisms to permit the
judicial process to continue without disclosing state secrets.306
A. The Solution Lies with the Judiciary
In a bizarre coda to the main opinion in Jeppesen Dataplan, the Ninth
Circuit suggests that its dismissal of the action is not intended to preclude
plaintiffs from seeking “other remedies”; that is, non-judicial relief.307 The
alternatives to judicial relief are as follows: 1) the government itself may
provide a remedy through reparations or otherwise without disclosing state
secrets;308 2) Congress may investigate and “restrain excesses by the
executive”;309 3) Congress can enact private bills and thus provide nonjudicial remedies for uncompensated injuries;310 and 4) Congress can enact
remedial legislation authorizing causes of action to address claims like
those brought by the plaintiffs in Jeppesen Dataplan.311
There are three problems with this reasoning. Most obviously and least
significantly, the likelihood of any of these alternative remedies becoming
available to a group of foreign suspected terrorists is so slight as to be
risible.312 The fact that six judges on a U.S. Court of Appeals would
subscribe to the notion that Congress would bestir itself (through a private
bill no less!) on behalf of such people does not speak well for the political
acumen of the Judiciary.313
The aftermath of one SSP case, Tenenbaum v. Simioni,314 illustrates the
futility of seeking help from the Legislature. The Tenenbaums sued various

306.
See Wells Congressional Testimony, supra note 245, at 3 (arguing that courts should protect
“legitimate national security interests while permitting litigation to proceed with non-privileged
evidence, and that cases should not be dismissed based on the state secrets privilege except as a very
last resort”).
307.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
308.
See id. (citing the precedent of reparations for Japanese Latin Americans abducted and
interned in the United States during World War II).
309.
Id.
310.
Id. at 1091–92.
311.
Id. at 1092.
312.
See id. at 1101 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s suggestion of payment
of reparations to the victims of extraordinary rendition “elevates the impractical to the point of
absurdity”).
313.
See Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the
Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665, 669–701 (2002) (“[T]he availability of legislative
compensation through private bills is limited by the realities of politics and influence.”).
314.
Donohue, supra note 17, at 190.
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federal employees alleging that they had been subject to a criminal
espionage investigation based only on their race and ethnicity.315 The
district court dismissed the claim on SSP grounds and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.316 Thwarted by the SSP in their quest for justice, David
Tenenbaum then enlisted his Senator, Carl Levin, to uncover the relevant
facts.317 In response to Levin’s inquiries, the Department of Defense
conducted an investigation and determined that Mr. Tenenbaum’s race and
ethnicity had “‘contributed to the unusual and unwelcome scrutiny’” to
which he had been subjected.318 Armed with this information, Tenenbaum
filed a second case, alleging that an improper invocation of the SSP had
deprived him of access to the courts. His claims were found barred under
the doctrine of res judicata.319
The result in the Sibel Edmonds case against the FBI was similar.320
Senators Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley asked the FBI to investigate
Edmonds’ allegations. The resulting report concluded that: 1) the FBI was
unable to demonstrate that Edmonds would not have been terminated but
for her whistleblowing activities; and 2) the FBI’s investigations of her
claims had been inadequate.321 While the report did lead to certain reforms
within the FBI’s translation operations, it did not bring any relief to Ms.
Edmonds, whose case was subsequently dismissed by the D.C. Circuit.322
Second, the proposed remedies are inadequate to the extent that they
can provide only monetary damages—and to some extent those monetary
damages would come so far in the future as to be cold comfort.323 Thus, for

315.
Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004).
316.
Id.
317.
Donohue, supra note 17, at 191.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. (citing Tenenbaum v. Ashcroft, No. 09-10612, 2009 WL 2222933, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July
23, 2009)).
320.
See discussion supra notes 185–198; Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d. 65
(D.D.C. 2004).
321.
Donohue, supra note 17, 193–95 (citing OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & REVIEW, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH
ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY CONTRACT LINGUIST SIBEL EDMONDS: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf).
322.
Donohue, supra note 17, at 195–96.
323.
Reparations for Japanese Latin Americans came more than fifty years after their internment
and were grossly inadequate to fully redress the wrongs done to those interned. The original settlement
cited to by the Jeppesen Dataplan majority, Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97 (1999), was
intended to provide only a “symbol of restitution rather than actual monetary damages.” Id. at 97. By
the time that settlement was announced, over one-third of the Japanese Latin American internees were
already dead. See Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Compensation to Persons of Japanese Ancestry Interned
During Second World War, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 654, 655 (1999) (noting that only 1300 of an estimated
2000 internees were still alive in 1998). Many of the survivors refused to participate in the settlement,
preferring to pursue a more satisfactory form of justice under the Torture Victims Protection Act. See
id. (observing that the government expected only about 550 Japanese Latin Americans to participate in
the settlement); Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the
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example, even in the unlikely event that Congress were to pass a private
bill to compensate a person who had been subjected to extraordinary
rendition and torture, such a bill would raise constitutional issues and likely
be vetoed if it sought to identify or punish the people responsible for the
tortious conduct.324 But the identification and punishment of wrongdoers is
a significant part of what litigants seek in bringing torts claims. Plaintiffs
who are barred from seeking justice because of the SSP often seek not only
money damages but legal vindication and public acknowledgment of the
wrong that has been done them.325 Thus, Jose Padilla has sued John Yoo
for his alleged role in promoting government torture seeking $1 in
damages.326
Another good illustration of the point is the case of Maher Arar.327 Mr.
Arar has already received $10 million Canadian328 in compensation for the
harms done to him when he was detained at JFK International Airport and
subjected to extraordinary rendition and torture in Syria.329 He nonetheless
pursued civil claims against the U.S. government as well.330 He did so not
because he needs more money but because he wants to force the United
States to own up to its misconduct as the Canadian government has done.331

World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians—A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV. 275 (1998) (providing
a full account of the inadequacies of the settlement).
324.
See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 91 (2006)
(“Any attempt to use a private bill to punish a particular person would raise constitutional concerns
under the Due Process and Bill of Attainder clauses . . . .”).
325.
See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (developing a theory of
corrective justice according to which an individual has a duty to make good another’s wrongful loss if
she is responsible for having brought that loss about); Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 403 (1992) (providing an Aristotelian account of corrective justice). It follows that justice is
served when the party responsible for the harm (and not, e.g., the federal government through
legislative enactment) is required to accept blame and provide the remedy that justice demands. See
Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 27 (1995) (“[I]n every
account of corrective justice, there is presumed to be a relationship between the parties that makes the
claims of corrective justice appropriate to them—and not to others.”).
326.
First Amended Complaint at 19–21, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(No. 3:08-cv-00035), 2008 WL 2433172.
327.
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated and superseded, 585 F.3d
559 (2d Cir. 2009).
328.
George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability & the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits
as Truth & Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 203 (2011).
329.
See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Justice, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6?currentPage=all (recounting that Arar
was apprehended in New York as a suspected terrorist and sent to Syria, where he was subjected to
months of brutal interrogation, including torture).
330.
Arar alleged violations of substantive due process and the Torture Victim Protection Act,
and sought declaratory judgment in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. Arar, 414 F.Supp.
2d at 257–58.
331.
His case was dismissed on statutory and abstention doctrines that mooted the government’s
assertion of the SSP, and the Second Circuit sustained that dismissal. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559,
568 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (affirming dismissal of Arar’s Torture Victims Protection Act as
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The alternative remedies suggested by the Jeppesen Dataplan majority,
even if they were available, would not provide the full relief that plaintiffs
seek.
Finally, as noted by the Jeppesen Dataplan dissenters, courts abdicate
their constitutional duties when they defer to the political branches in this
realm.332 The SSP is a creation of the courts, and it is well within their
power and their institutional competences to repair it.333 Moreover, while
the political branches could step in to fix the SSP, they are unlikely to do so
in a timely manner.
While some defenders of an expansive SSP have stressed its
“constitutional underpinnings,”334 there are also constitutional interests that
speak in favor of the courts’ power to check the Executive’s otherwise
unrestrained assertions of the SSP. Congress has constitutional power to act
in this realm and repeatedly has enacted legislation empowering courts to
address claims of executive secrecy that arise in the context of litigation.335
Clearly, this is not a realm of plenary executive power. Rather, we are in
Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” of concurrent executive and
congressional powers,336 and Congress has used its powers to call for
judicial review of executive claims of secrecy.337
There should be nothing shocking about the idea that courts can be
involved in settling questions of public access to state secrets. Many

insufficiently pled); id. at 581 (affirming dismissal of Arar’s Bivens claims on the ground that Congress
rather than the Judiciary has the institutional competence to provide an appropriate remedy).
332.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Hawkins, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for “disregard[ing] the concept of checks and
balances,” depriving the Judiciary of its role and depriving plaintiffs “of a fair assessment of their
claims a neutral arbiter”).
333.
See Telman, supra note 20, at 506–07 (addressing courts’ constitutional powers to deal with
government secrecy); id. at 507–10 (addressing institutional competence issues).
334.
Mukasey Letter, supra note 305, at 2–3 (questioning whether Congress has constitutional
authority to legislate in the area of the SSP). Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Assertion of
State Secrets Privilege at 3–4, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-240-DGT-VVP (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005);
Chesney, supra note 20, at 1261; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (calling
executive privilege “inextricably rooted” in the separation of powers); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 6 n.9 (1953) (indicating that the SSP is rooted in the notion of the separation of powers); El
Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.Supp.2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006) (describing the privilege as deriving from the
President’s constitutional authority over foreign and military affairs).
335.
See Neil Kinkopf, The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It?, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 489,
498 (2008) (concluding that Congress has ample constitutional authority to reform the SSP).
336.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (describing a “zone of twilight” in which the President and Congress have
concurrent authority or in which the division of powers is uncertain).
337.
See Samaha, supra note 67, at 915 (noting that Congress and the Executive Branch have
constructed a system for addressing claims for access to secret information and that this system enlists
the Judiciary); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“Whatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake.”).
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countries have constitutional mechanisms designed to strike a balance
between public access and government secrecy, and they assign to courts a
role in policing that balance.338 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutional power of the courts to serve as a check on executive claims
of secrecy, even when the government claims that such secrecy is
necessary to safeguard national security.339 In short, there is no need for
further congressional action to provide a right of action for people like the
Jeppesen Dataplan plaintiffs, because Congress has already designated
courts as the appropriate venue for the vindication of rights violated
through government misconduct.
B. The SSP As a Shield, Not a Sword
The problem with the SSP, as with government secrecy more generally,
is that all of the incentives point in the same direction. No government
agency has ever been disciplined in any meaningful way for abuse of the
SSP.340 The worst thing that could happen—and this happens exceedingly
rarely—is that the court will simply find that the government’s assertion of
the SSP is not justified.341 When first confronted with the government’s
assertion of the SSP in Reynolds, the Third Circuit was appropriately
concerned that “the privilege against disclosure might gradually be
enlarged by executive determinations until . . . it embraced the whole range
of governmental activities.”342 While the SSP has not yet become the
exception that has swallowed the rule of governmental accountability, it
has become a major obstacle to democratic processes that seek to determine
what exactly the government has been up to in the name of the people.
In order to deter abuse of the privilege, courts should apply the SSP
even-handedly. If the SSP deprives plaintiffs of information necessary to
their claim, the court may have to dismiss the complaint; although for
reasons discussed below, that extreme remedy should rarely be necessary.
If the SSP deprives the government or its contractors of information
necessary to an affirmative defense, the result may be a judgment for
plaintiffs; although that too, for the same reasons, ought to be a rarity.343
338.
See Samaha, supra note 67, at 924–32 (surveying foreign constitutional provisions
governing access to information and describing the roles of courts recognized under such provisions).
339.
See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1972) (finding that
the Fourth Amendment requires judicial review of domestic security surveillance).
340.
See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 221, at 86 (concluding that only possible cost to
government of excessive assertions of privilege is “bad publicity”).
341.
As of 2001, the SSP had been invoked in over fifty reported cases, and in only four of those
cases did the courts reject the assertion. Id. at 101–02.
342.
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951).
343.
This very issue was before the Supreme Court this term in two consolidated cases, Boeing
Company v. United States and General Dynamics Corp. v. United States. In those cases, Petitioners
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The Reynolds court called for a balancing of interests in connection with
the SSP, and an even-handed application of the SSP is a way to achieve
that goal. Evidence that such an approach is workable is provided by CIPA,
which was enacted in 1980 to address the problem of the introduction of
secret evidence in criminal prosecutions.344 Several authorities suggest that
CIPA could provide a model for the reform of the SSP.345
CIPA is especially relevant, given the argument that treating the SSP
like other evidentiary privileges would encourage claims against the
government that seek not justice but quick settlement.346 CIPA was
introduced with graymail by criminal defendants specifically in mind,347
and it struck a far more reasonable balance than has the SSP between the
interests of the government in protecting state secrets and the interests of
the adverse litigant of bringing to light facts relevant to her case.348 In the
CIPA context, the statute provides for the full panoply of options short of
contended that the government had, in the same case: (1) sought dismissal of petitioners’ claims
because the SSP precluded it from asserting an affirmative defense; and (2) sought to preclude
petitioners from asserting their prima facie valid affirmative defense to the government’s contractual
claims based on the SSP. Petitioners contended that it is unfair, and in fact a due process violation, to
permit the government “to use the state secrets privilege both offensively and defensively in the same
case, always to Contractors’ disadvantage.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari 28-34, Boeing Co. v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-1302); see also Petition for Certiorari 15, Gen. Dynamics Corp. v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2011) (No. 09-1298) (arguing that it is “pernicious” to allow the
government to pursue its own claim while using the SSP to preclude affirmative defenses). The Court
determined that in a case such as this one, in which neither party can prevail without reliance on
materials subject to the SSP, a court must leave the parties where it found them. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
131 S. Ct. at 1909. Although this may seem even-handed, it is not, because the government can decide
whether or not to declassify material that is useful to it in litigation while still maintaining that material
useful to the other party is barred from discovery due to the SSP.
344.
See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT
(CIPA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (1989), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/89-172.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2012) (“Congress enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to provide
a means for determining . . . whether a prosecution may proceed that both protects information the
Executive regards as sensitive to security and assures the defendant a fair trial consistent with the
mandates of the Constitution.”).
345.
Senator Kennedy, in introducing the State Secrets Protection Act, called it a “civil version of
CIPA.” Press Release, Office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy Introduces State Secrets
Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_cr/statesec.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2012); see also Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243–44 (4th Cir.
1985) (citing CIPA as evidence of the court’s ability to fashion procedures to protect against the
disclosure of classified information); Wells Congressional Testimony, supra note 245, at 6–7
(proposing a modified CIPA structure as a model for the reform of the SSP). In Horn v. Huddle, 636 F.
Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C. 2009), Judge Lamberth rejected the government’s assertion of the SSP and
instituted pre-trial procedures modeled on CIPA.
346.
See Pines, supra note 104, at 1282–83 (contending that plaintiffs dislike the Totten doctrine
because it deprives them of the opportunity to graymail the government).
347.
Victor Hansen & Lawrence Friedman, The Case Against Secret Evidence, 12 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 772, 786 (2007) (stating that CIPA was designed to address graymail cases “in
which defendants threatened to disclose classified information at trial to force the government to
dismiss the case”).
348.
Id. at 788 (characterizing CIPA as forcing the government to choose between disclosing
classified information and foregoing prosecution of the defendant).
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acquittal in order to facilitate prosecution while protecting state secrets.
Under CIPA, courts have discretion to determine how necessary the
classified information is to the defendant’s case;349 whether it is useful,
relevant and admissible;350 whether such information can be introduced in
whole or in part;351 or whether some other evidence establishing the same
facts may be proffered by the government.352 The government can also
request that the prosecution proceed in camera and that the record of such
proceedings be placed under seal353 so as to protect classified
information.354 If the government will not agree to the release of classified
information, it bears the burden of proving that dismissal of the case does
not serve the interests of justice.355
The standard objection to arguments in favor of reforming the SSP
using CIPA as a model is that the civil and criminal contexts are
fundamentally different.356 Long before CIPA was passed, courts
recognized that the government must forego any claim of privilege with
respect to secret documents relevant to a criminal prosecution.357 For
example, the Reynolds Court invoked the distinction between civil and
criminal suits, noting it would be unconscionable to allow the government
“to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to
deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.”358
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion, although it termed such a
turn of events a denial to the defendant of his constitutional rights, rather
than relying on the fuzzier notion of unconscionability.359
349.
See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004) (district court must
determine whether “the information the Government seeks to withhold is material to the defense”);
United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2006) (same) (citing United States v. Yunis, 867
F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
350.
See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 6(a) (2006) (providing for a
hearing upon motion by government at which the court is to “make all determinations concerning the
use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial
or pretrial proceeding.”).
351.
§ 8.
352.
§ 6(c). In Reynolds, the SSP worked similarly. The Court was persuaded that the allegedly
privileged Accident Investigation Report need not be produced in part because it believed that the same
information could be provided through witness testimony. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11
(1953).
353.
§ 6(a).
354.
§ 6(d).
355.
§ 6(e).
356.
See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1905–06 (2011) (citing
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12).
357.
See United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (stating that the
government may not suppress documents in a criminal proceeding); see also Donohue, supra note 17, at
205 n.671 (citing cases pre-dating CIPA).
358.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
359.
See United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (finding that a refusal to
allow defendant access to evidence was a denial of a constitutional right).
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Here, the government tries to have it both ways. In the SSP context, the
government argues that civil litigants are not entitled to the same
protections as are criminal defendants, because civil litigants have chosen
to sue the government.360 But in the criminal context, the government
makes various arguments to persuade courts to deny defendants access to
secret information.361 The most common mechanism for doing so is a
strenuous claim that the secret information is not relevant to the defense.362
In addition, some courts have allowed the government to assert the SSP in
the criminal context and then withhold the documents despite their
relevance.363
As with concerns that courts will make inadvertent disclosures that will
compromise national security, the concerns here that plaintiffs will try to
graymail the government appear to be wholly hypothetical. The SSP has
generally arisen in one of four contexts, none of which are likely to be
conducive to graymail.364 First, there are SSP cases in which plaintiffs
worked for the government and allege that they were the victims of some
sort of employment discrimination.365 If the government has a nondiscriminatory ground for the adverse employment decision, it can easily
state that affirmative defense in an in camera proceeding or through some
other mechanism that protects secret information. Suing the government is
360.
In a recent argument before the Supreme Court, there was much discussion of the question
of whether the Petitioners were the “moving party,” because the Justices seemed to think that the
government as the non-moving party was entitled to assert the SSP. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
5, General Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (No. 1298), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-1298.pdf (statement of Mr. Phillips, counsel for Petitioners)
(arguing that the government must suffer the consequences of the SSP when it is the “moving party”);
id. at 16 (statement of Justice Ginsburg) (suggesting that with respect to their own claims, Petitioners
are the “moving party”); id. at 26 (statement of Justice Breyer) (noting that Reynolds indicates that the
SSP cannot foreclose government action where the government is not the moving party); id. at 33–34
(statement of Justice Scalia) (contending that the government is the moving party in these cases). Only
Justice Kagan really seemed to grasp the government’s position on the effects of the SSP when she told
the Acting Solicitor General that his position “really does sound like a tails you win, heads you win.”
Id. at 45. Ultimately, Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous Court, concluded that the question of
which party is the moving party is irrelevant. General Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1906 (observing that
Reynolds is not really applicable to the case at bar, and that its dictum regarding moving parties is less
so).
361.
See generally Donohue, supra note 17, at 204–13 (discussing the ambiguous status of the
SSP in criminal prosecutions).
362.
See United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that, in denying
defendant access to secret information, the district court had not denied the defendant any material
evidence).
363.
See Donohue, supra note 17, at 212–13 (discussing motion for a protective order in SEC v.
Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Colo. 2009)).
364.
Laura Donohue identifies a broader array of SSP cases, including allegations of
environmental degradation and defamation and two criminal cases in which the government
successfully invoked the SSP. Donohue, supra note 17, at 89. The classification provided here is thus
an oversimplification, but the likelihood of graymail in these other contexts appears either equally
remote or equally unlikely to be addressed through the SSP.
365.
See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing Molerio, Webster, Tilden, Sterling, and Edmonds).
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uphill litigation in which the odds are long.366 It seems unlikely that
someone would risk their chances of future employment on a scheme to
force the government into settlement through the threat of legal action. The
threat of running to the press seems a much less risky and less costly
endeavor, and the chances of success seem at least as good.367
A second context in which the SSP arises involves people who claim to
have been the victims of illegal government surveillance.368 For the most
part, these people do not have the means to graymail the government,
because the SSP prevents them from getting the facts that they need to
establish their causes of action, and thus of necessity also prevents them
from gaining access to materials with which to threaten the government
with graymail.369 In any case, they are unlikely to engage in graymail
because there is no evidence that the people who bring these suits are
interested in money. They have alleged violations of their privacy rights
and they seek injunctions and declaratory relief, not monetary damages.370
The third context in which the SSP arises is in suits brought by people
claiming to have been victims of extraordinary rendition.371 Some of these
people might be interested in money damages, but most likely their main
interests in the litigation are dignitary. They seek official government

366.
See Stewart Macaulay, Almost Everything That I Did Want to Know About Contract
Litigation: A Comment on Galanter, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 629, 635 (2001) (“The employee suing a
corporation that formerly employed her is involved in uphill litigation, and the game is very likely to
involve a one-shotter suing an institution that has all the advantages of a repeat player.”).
367.
While there may be some cases in which the SSP has protected the government against
graymail, at least one plaintiff whose quest for justice was thwarted by the SSP seems to have disclosed
secret information through a mechanism far more straightforward than graymail. According to a federal
indictment unsealed in January 2011, former CIA agent Jeffrey Sterling, who unsuccessfully sued the
government for discrimination, is accused of leaking classified information about Iran to New York
Times reporter, James Risen. Adam Goldman, Jeffrey Sterling, Ex-CIA Officer, Charged with Leak to
Times Reporter, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2011, 7:23 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
01/06/jeffrey-sterling-leak-charge_n_805397.html.
368.
See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (involving plaintiffs who claimed that
they were wrongfully subjected to government surveillance as part of the Bush Administration’s
Terrorist Surveillance Program); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (involving claims of
illegal government surveillance during the Vietnam era); In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 564
F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (alleging that the National Security Agency violated FISA through
warrantless surveillance); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (involving
plaintiffs who claimed that their telephone records were illegally disclosed to the National Security
Agency); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (alleging constitutional and
statutory violations arising from the government’s warrantless wiretapping program).
369.
See supra notes 291–292 and accompanying text.
370.
See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d at 649–50 (observing that plaintiffs sought declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief); Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (noting that plaintiffs sought only
injunctive and declaratory relief).
371.
See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y.
2006).
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acknowledgment of the wrongs it has committed.372 Like those who claim
that they are the victims of illegal government surveillance, these plaintiffs
lack both the motivation and the means to graymail the government. They
make their allegations based on public information or based on their own
experiences. If the SSP did not function to immunize government agents
and government contractors for their allegedly unlawful conduct, the
government would simply be forced to either defend that conduct or refuse
to cooperate and face whatever sanctions the court would choose to
impose. But note that such sanctions would only be necessary in cases in
which plaintiffs could make out a prima facie case without the use of
privileged information and the government would be unable to assert its
affirmative defenses because no such defense could be mounted without
recourse to privileged information. Here, there is a very small risk that a
very crafty and well-positioned party could attempt to use the threat of
litigation to extort a payment from the government. Given the small chance
of such a scenario playing out, the resulting graymail payments might be
viewed as a reasonable cost for the government to pay for the benefit of
protecting national security secrets.
Finally, there are cases involving disputes either between the
government and parties with whom it contracts or among parties to such
contracts who are in possession of secret information. While it is certainly
imaginable that defense contractors, for example, might use the threat of
disclosures in the context of litigation as a tool to extract payments from
the government, that scenario also seems highly unlikely. The companies
with whom the government contracts usually are or would like to be repeat
players. Staying in the good graces of the government is absolutely
essential to their business. Suing your main customer in search of shortterm gains is not a wise business strategy. In any case, as indicated in the
discussion of the Totten doctrine supra, government contractors already
may extract extra consideration from the government as a sort of insurance
policy against a government breach, because recovery for such a breach
may well be barred by Totten or the SSP. In any case, contractors, like
former employees, do not need to use the courts if they are interested in
extracting graymail from the government. But if they do, recent scholarship
indicates that government contractors routinely use the threat of disclosure
to entice the government to intervene in suits and assert the SSP.373 In
short, the current iteration of the SSP invites rather than deters graymail.

372.
See discussion of Maher Arar’s and Jose Padilla’s cases, supra text accompanying notes
326–331.
373.
See Donohue, supra note 17, at 88, 136 (arguing that contractors may be using a form of
graymail, threatening to disclose classified information in litigation if the government does not
intervene and assert the SSP to protect its contractors).
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While the arguments that the government needs the SSP in order to
protect itself against graymail are weak, there is strong evidence that the
SSP has enabled the government and its contractors to engage in
unconstitutional takings and thus deter individuals and entrepreneurs from
developing technological innovations that can contribute to national
defense.374 This social cost associated with the SSP is well illustrated in
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, in which the Federal Circuit upheld
the dismissal of the plaintiff corporation’s claims on SSP grounds.375
The case involved an invention by the principals behind Crater
Corporation (“Crater”), which they patented in 1991.376 Lucent approached
Crater, thinking that the invention could help in the creation of an airtight
coupling for use in underwater fiber optic networks.377 Lucent allegedly
sought technical data, drawings and other information that constituted trade
secrets, subject to various representations that it would not share the
information or produce a device using Crater’s intellectual property until a
license agreement could be finalized.378 In a suit filed in 1998, Crater
alleged that Lucent violated this agreement by using Crater’s intellectual
property to make a coupling and disseminating Crater’s intellectual
property to third parties. Crater alleged patent infringement and state law
claims sounding in breach of contract and misappropriation of trade
secrets.379 The government moved to intervene in 1999 and asserted the
SSP to prevent Crater from conducting any discovery relating to the use or
manufacture of Crater’s coupling device by the United States.380
The government eventually identified 26,000 documents potentially
responsive to Crater’s discovery requests and concluded that every single
one of them was subject to the SSP.381 The district court dismissed all of
Crater’s claims, either because it could not make out its claim without
documents subject to the SSP or because Lucent could not establish its
defenses without recourse to documents subject to the SSP.382 The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s finding that the SSP

374.
See Isaacs & Farley, supra note 247, at 801 (discussing Crater Corp. v. Lucent
Technologies, a case in which a technology corporation’s claims relating to Lucent’s alleged
misappropriation of the plaintiffs’ intellectual property was dismissed because of the SSP). For a quick
review of the increasing importance of collaborations involving the U.S. military and technology
companies beginning during the Cold War, see Donohue, supra note 17, at 92–99.
375.
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
376.
See Isaacs & Farley, supra note 247, at 789 (describing patent application of Philip French
and his co-inventors).
377.
Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1262.
378.
Id.
379.
Id.
380.
Id. at 1263.
381.
Id. at 1264.
382.
Id. at 1265.

TELMAN EIC MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

494

Alabama Law Review

2/24/2012 10:32 AM

[Vol. 63:3:429

was properly invoked,383 but it reinstated Crater’s state law claims because
the district court had not adequately determined their nature and thus was
not in a position to determine what impact, if any, the SSP would have on
those claims.384 On remand, the district court dismissed the Crater’s claims
for lack of evidence385 and the Federal Circuit affirmed.386
The case illustrates the dangers that invocation of the SSP can pose to
small technology firms. If the facts alleged in Crater are taken as true, a
well-established firm such as Lucent can make use of a small firm’s
innovations to design something for the government and then use the SSP
to shield itself from liability for the breach of contract, misappropriation of
trade secrets or patent violation, or both. The result could be that “[s]maller
companies that specialize in cutting-edge technologies . . . may become
reluctant to partner with corporations who essentially steal their
technologies and then draw the veil of state secrets over the dispute.”387 As
Judge Newman pointed out in her partial dissent in the case, it is not in the
nation’s interest to bar judicial relief when disputes arise among parties
involved in projects in the public interest,388 especially when the costs of
dismissal of such suits fall disproportionately on the inventors
themselves.389
C. Alternatives to Dismissal
In the CIPA context, courts have demonstrated repeatedly that handling
protected national security information is not beyond their capacities.390
FOIA also assigns to courts a role in reviewing executive claims that
classified material may not be disclosed.391 Courts have the institutional
competence, the experience, and the constitutional authority under the
doctrine of checks and balances to perform the same function with respect
to the SSP.
Courts were inventive in this area before 9/11, and it is instructive to
remind ourselves of the sorts of creative solutions that are possible if courts
are willing to reassert their constitutional authority to review executive
claims of privilege. Procedures adopted by courts to test invocations of the

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1267–69.
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790, 807 (E.D. Mo. 2007).
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 319 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Donohue, supra note 17, at 131.
Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1270–71 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Isaacs & Farley, supra note 247, at 807.
Hansen & Friedman, supra note 347, at 793.
See discussion supra accompanying notes 75–83.
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SSP include in camera hearings and bench trials, appointments of special
masters, protective orders, redaction of names, and use of sealed testimony.
For example, in Halpern v. United States,392 the Second Circuit
responded to the assertion of the SSP by remanding the entire case for an in
camera trial.393 Such a remedy may only be appropriate in cases in which
keeping secrets from the plaintiffs or from witnesses is not a significant
concern.394 Simply eliminating the jury and trying the case before a special
master may suffice. In Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,395 the
Second Circuit was persuaded that a jury trial was inappropriate because a
“large amount of material properly classified confidential and secret must
be submitted to the trier of fact in the case.”396 The Second Circuit
therefore upheld the trial court’s decision to refer the case to a special
master pursuant to Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.397
Similarly, in the recent case of Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,398 which relates to
alleged NSA wiretapping and data-mining programs, the court
contemplated the appointment of a special expert “pursuant to [Federal
Rule of Evidence] 706 to assist the court in determining whether disclosing
particular evidence would create a ‘reasonable danger’ of harming national
security.”399
In some cases, it may be possible to protect state secrets by adding an
attorney to plaintiffs’ legal team who has security clearance or by granting
security clearance to one of plaintiffs’ current counsel.400 For example, in
cases relating to a Guantánamo detainee, the District Court for the District
of Columbia required that a plaintiff have access to counsel with the
appropriate level of security clearance,401 and the court worked out a
392.
258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
393.
Id. at 43 (holding that district court should proceed in camera if it could do so “without
running any serious risk of divulgence of military secrets”).
394.
The court was persuaded that trial in camera was feasible in Halpern because plaintiff and
all witnesses were already familiar with the secret invention at the heart of the case. Id.
395.
558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1977).
396.
Id. at 1132.
397.
Id. at 1132–33.
398.
439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
399.
Id. at 1010 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 706(a)); see also AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush,
451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1233 (D. Or. 2006) (suggesting the appointment of a national security expert as a
special master to assess the impact of disclosure of the alleged secrets), rev’d, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir.
2007), remanded to 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
400.
A request to do so was denied by the court in Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3–4 (D.D.C.
July 28, 2004) (order granting motion dismiss). See discussion in Donohue, supra note 17, at 174–75.
401.
See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2004) (requiring that counsel
have “security clearance at the level appropriate for the level of knowledge the Government believes is
possessed by the detainee”); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C.
2004) (requiring that petitioners’ counsel receive “necessary security clearance” to gain access to
classified information relevant to cases); cf. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 275–76
(4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (suggesting that the parties might identify alternative counsel who could
receive the necessary security clearance should present counsel be unable to obtain such clearance).
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special framework designed to safeguard national security while also
securing the individual right of access to counsel.402 A court may also issue
a protective order requiring that depositions be conducted in a secure
facility and in the presence of government security officers who advise
deponents as to what information may be revealed.403
Another approach is for courts to place reasonable time restrictions on
the scope of the SSP. In In re United States,404 the D.C. Circuit was
unconvinced that the disclosure of twenty-year-old secrets relating to
government surveillance of a Communist Party member created a
reasonable danger to national security,405 and it expressed its confidence
that the district court could “‘disentangle’ the sensitive from the
nonsensitive information as the case unfolds.”406 It follows that, as argued
supra with respect to Totten cases, even if courts have to dismiss cases on
state secrets grounds, they should do so without prejudice to the refiling of
the case upon declassification of the relevant information.407 Courts should
suspend any relevant statutes of limitations so as to permit cases to be
brought after the dangers attendant to disclosure lapse.
Other courts have taken a more radical approach, which some would
argue pushes beyond the boundaries of permissible judicial checks on
executive powers, but which was not expressly foreclosed by Reynolds. In
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America,408 the District Court for the District of
Columbia stated that no evidence concerning the government’s illegal acts,
nor any evidence refuting allegations of government illegality, can be
privileged.409 Such an approach would clearly prevent the transformation of
the SSP into a form of executive immunity. In Elson v. Bowen,410 the
Supreme Court of Nevada found Reynolds to be “the key to the roomful of

402.
See Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 13–14 (permitting unmonitored meetings between petitioner
and counsel but requiring petitioner’s attorney to submit any information derived from such meetings to
government classification review if counsel wished to disclose such information to anyone else); In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 183–91 (setting forth procedures for counsel access to
Guantánamo detainees, including requirements that such counsel have or obtain security clearance).
403.
See In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the trial court granted
a protective order filed by the government that allowed depositions to be conducted in secure facilities
and in the presence of government security officers).
404.
872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
405.
Id. at 479 (finding itself, for myriad reasons, unable to determine based on its in camera
review of a government affidavit that the disclosure of information relating to decades-old government
activities would reveal state secrets).
406.
Id. (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
407.
A similar approach is that of the district court in Hepting, which refused to allow certain
discovery, but invited plaintiffs to revisit the issue as continuing disclosures regarding the challenged
NSA surveillance program might make public the information with respect to which the government
was asserting the Privilege. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 997–98 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
408.
371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974).
409.
Id. at 101–02.
410.
436 P.2d 12 (Nev. 1967).
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obscurity in this difficult area,” but stressed that cases caution that
“[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers.”411 In Elson, the trial court reviewed the
claims of privilege and determined that government security was not
endangered by disclosure.412 The Nevada Supreme Court nonetheless felt
compelled to advise the parties as follows: “Government cannot break the
law to enforce the law . . . and it follows that government should not be
allowed to use the claims of executive privilege and departmental
regulations as a shield of immunity for the unlawful conduct of its
representatives.” 413
In Tilden, the court cautioned that revealing state secrets, even in
camera, posed a threat of leaks.414 The court pointed out, logically enough,
that the more people who have access to secret information, the less secret
the information becomes.415 The problem with this argument is that it turns
Reynolds on its head. As Judge Skelly Wright pointed out,
the principle of Reynolds was not that military or diplomatic
information may not be reviewed by a trial judge, but that a trial
judge should not unnecessarily require disclosure in situations
where he is satisfied, based on other information, that the
documents requested should in fact be accorded a privileged
status.416
Moreover, in Tilden, neither the court, nor any other sources that I have
been able to locate cite to a single example of a court being the source of a
national security leak. Such leaks are much more likely to come from the
Executive or Legislative Branch, as Wikileaks has now demonstrated.417
An argument can be made that courts are far better guardians of national
security information than are either the Legislative418 or the Executive
Branches.419
411.
Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953)).
412.
Id. at 16–17.
413.
Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
414.
Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (E.D. Va. 2000).
415.
Id. at 627 n.1.
416.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 625 n.81 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
417.
The main source for the classified documents published by Wikileaks seems to have been a
23-year-old private in the Marine Corps, Bradley Manning. See Scott Shane, Accused Soldier in Brig as
Wikileaks Link Is Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/
world/14manning.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=bradley%20manning&st=cse.
418.
Leaks by the Legislature, while not as common as leaks by members of the Executive
Branch, are not infrequent. To take just one recent example, on January 26, 2011, Representative Ron
Paul read excerpts from a classified U.S. State Department cable into the Congressional Record. See
157 CONG. REC. H503 (daily ed. Jan 26, 2011) (statement of Rep. Paul), available at
http://www.fas.org/ sgp/congress/2011/paul012611.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (arguing that the
documents classification was not justified given that its purpose was “to hide the truth from the
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Jeppesen Dataplan should alert
the nation to the outrages and absurdities resulting from the conflation of
the SSP and Totten. Taking as true the plaintiffs’ allegations that a
contractor working for the U.S. government had kidnapped plaintiffs and
delivered them for torture abroad, the court nonetheless dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims without even waiting for the defendant to answer the
complaint, despite the fact that plaintiffs attached to the complaint ample
evidence in support of their claims. This Article contends that such
dismissals are not necessary. Following Reynolds, the Ninth Circuit should
have remanded the case and permitted discovery to proceed. Only once the
parties had exchanged discovery requests and Jeppesen had asserted its
affirmative defenses, if any, should the district court have entertained the
government’s claims of privilege. The case then should have proceeded
either without the privileged evidence or in a manner that protected that
evidence from disclosure.
The SSP is an evidentiary privilege. As such it should only rarely lead
to the dismissal of claims, and then only when plaintiffs are unable to make
out their prima facie case without evidence removed by the SSP.
Dismissals are occurring in cases like Jeppesen Dataplan because, at the
government’s urging, judges have confused the SSP and Totten, and
because Totten, overbroad from the start, has been extended to cases to
which it ought not apply. The result is that courts have abdicated their roles
as fora in which parties can vindicate their rights and demand redress.
Granting the government and its agents immunity from suit for intolerable
abuses of human rights is an intolerable abuse of the SSP.

American people and keep our government from being embarrassed”). According to the Federation of
American Scientists’ Secrecy News Blog, this conduct violated House Rules. See Steven Aftergood,
Rep. Paul Quotes Classified Cable on House Floor, SECRECY NEWS, Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.fas.org/
blog/secrecy/2011/01/paul_classified.html#comments. The incident is perhaps trivial, since the
information had already been made public by Wikileaks, but judges have frequently treated as classified
information that has been made public but is still classified and have refused to allow it to be entered
into evidence.
419.
In the aftermath of the outing of Valerie Plame Wilson as a CIA agent, there was some
discussion of the extent of leaks of such sensitive information by the Executive Branch. The consensus
quickly emerged that there was no workable mechanism for controlling such leaks because they were
often authorized by the persons responsible for the original classification of the information. See
William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1453, 1470 (2008) (observing that previous investigations into leaks of classified information by the
Executive Branch often resulted in the discovery that the leaks were authorized by a White House or
cabinet official).

